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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The right to equality and non-discrimination is one of the fundamental principles of EU law. 
It is based on the EU Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), the general 
principles of EU law and EU secondary law. Anti-discrimination directives lay down specific 
rules for combating discrimination, but their scope is limited to certain fields and grounds of 
discrimination because the Treaties do not confer on the Union a general, cross-sectoral 
competence. Still, even the EU Treaties and the Charter may only apply within the scope of 
the application of EU law. Thus, whilst EU citizens are becoming more and more aware of 
their rights and are more likely to challenge national and EU acts deemed to be unlawful, 
they risk ‘knocking on the wrong door’ and ending up with their plea being rejected on 
competence grounds.  
 
This study analyses a sample of forty petitions related to anti-discrimination law received by 
the PETI Committee. These petitions are quite heterogeneous in terms of the respondent 
entity (the European Union or the Member States), the grounds of discrimination at issue 
(race and ethnicity, sexual orientation, nationality, age, disability, language, national 
minority or sex), and the legal sources invoked (the CFR or EU law in general). The fields 
where instances of discrimination allegedly occurred are also rather different.  
 
Some petitions target the conduct of a national public body or a civil servant or concern the 
application of a piece of domestic law to an individual case. In other cases petitioners claim 
there has been a lack of action to combat discrimination by a Member State. When the 
Member States' responsibility is at stake petitions often call on the European Parliament to 
promote initiatives at the national level or to monitor the proper implementation of EU law. 
In petitions which challenge the responsibility of the EU institutions, petitioners often ask for 
the adoption of new acts. However, often without specifying which measures they consider 
should be enacted. 
 
This study aims to scrutinise the issues stemming from the petitions received, with a view to 
providing a number of recommendations to the EP on how to deal with similar cases. The 
first two chapters pave the way for the analysis – in chapter three - of the petitions in order 
to ascertain whether they fall within the scope of application of EU law and, if so, which EU 
legal source is applicable. Also, the respective positions on the petitions taken by the PETI 
Committee and the European Commission – which in some cases diverge to a significant 
extent – are examined. Based on the outcomes of the analysis of petitions in the fourth and 
final chapter the authors provide suggestions on alternative models of reply which may help 
to strike a balance between the duty to comply with the CJEU’s stance on the boundaries of 
EU competence and the need to satisfy the legitimate expectations of the petitioners. 
 
A complete list of the petitions, classified by grounds of discrimination, is provided in Annex 
V. For each petition, the issue at stake, the legal source(s) mentioned and the Commission's 
view are summarised. The recurring themes (national minority and language; obstacles to 
the free movement of EU citizens and their family members, particularly in the case of LGBT 
families; child alternative care; age discrimination) are analysed more closely with the aim 
of providing advice on how the PETI Committee and the Commission might reply to the 
petitioners. A detailed analysis is provided for cases which are particularly sensitive or give 
rise to complex legal issues and/or for which the relevance of EU law is not immediately 
evident. 
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The petitions received show that the most crucial issues are those related to the exact 
definition of the boundaries of the EU competence to act. In some cases it is quite difficult to 
identify the scope of application of EU primary and secondary anti-discrimination law, notably 
when a national act is challenged. This is also a recurrent topic when petitioners challenge 
EU law and, in effect, it is addressed abundantly in reports, by academics and in CJEU case 
law. Nevertheless, it is crucial to the petitions analysed in this study and even the views 
expressed by the European Parliament and the European Commission on EU competence and 
the scope of application of anti-discrimination law are sometimes rather, if not radically, 
different. While the Parliament seems to endorse an overbroad interpretation of the limits of 
EU competence, the Commission often adopts an excessively narrow approach. 
 
The reasons for these two different approaches lie in the existence of ‘grey zones’, i.e. in 
situations or cases in which in principle EU law may apply. EU competence comes into play 
when a connection of a specific case to EU law is shown. This situation occurs for instance 
with national rules on family statutes in cases of free movement of EU citizens and their 
family members, including third country nationals. In other cases there may not be an EU 
legal act in force, but there is a prima facie relevant reference in the Treaties. This is the 
case for instance with regard to the protection of national minorities and discrimination on 
grounds of language, which are expressly mentioned in the Treaties and in Art. 21 CFR. Thus, 
it is understandable that EU citizens are tempted to invoke EU law and submit petitions to 
the EP in which they call for action. Unfortunately, their claims and requests are not always 
clearly defined.  
 
It is obvious that we cannot assume that petitioners are sophisticated lawyers who 
understand the exact scope and effects of all legal provisions, especially in disputes of 
competence, which cause different views and approaches even among academics, EU 
institutions and the judiciary. However, in cases where the EP, and the EU in general, has no 
competence to intervene, the outcome may be that issues raised in petitions remain unsolved 
because petitioners are ‘knocking on the wrong door’. Other cases are too complex to be 
dealt with satisfactorily through the petitions process, because they concern individual 
situations requiring a fact-specific legal assessment and where, for instance in the review of 
a claim of discrimination, all details of the facts must be considered and all rules on 
discrimination need to be applied, including definitions, exclusions and remedies.  
 
Nevertheless, an effective compromise solution must be found. On the one hand the CJEU’s 
stance on EU competence and scope of application must be followed, on the other hand the 
petitioners should be informed and advised about alternative means of redress which may 
be better suited to the situations and facts described in their petitions. Although these 
elements are already present in many of the replies to the petitions examined, in some cases 
alternative replies are available and could be suggested. Finally, it is important that 
petitioners (as well as other EU citizens) should be made aware that a ‘negative’ reply to a 
petition does not mean that EU is unwilling to act, but rather that EU is unable to act, and 
that this is often due to the lack of conferral of powers by Member States unwilling to give 
up their exclusive competence in several areas.  
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1. EU ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: A MULTI-LAYERED 
FRAMEWORK  
 
KEY ISSUES 
 Overview of all relevant provisions on discrimination: EU Treaties, CFR, and anti-
discrimination directives. 
 Analysis of the scope of application and the effects of each legal source also in 
private parties' disputes, taking into account that the current approach of the 
CJEU to the issue of direct horizontal effect of the Charter may have far-reaching 
implications in the field of non-discrimination.  
 Responsibility of Member States under EU anti-discrimination provisions. 
 
 
1.1. Non-discrimination under the EU Treaties  
1.1.1. Non-discrimination on grounds of nationality and sex 
 
The prohibition of nationality discrimination was contained in the founding Treaties at the 
birth of the European Community and has since seen an extraordinary development in case 
law and other legislative provisions. This area of law evolved around the two pillars of 
discrimination, viz nationality and sex (see also below paragraphs 2.2 and 2.5), both of which 
have a double aim which is social and economic at the same time. 
 
In a system where the EU legal order must coexist with multiple national legal orders, the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality has assumed a key role, encouraging 
the creation of the internal market and free movement between the Member States. The 
CJEU itself has specified this rule to be of fundamental importance and to produce direct 
effects, both vertical and horizontal.1 
 
There are specific prohibitions laid down in Part Three (Union Policies and Internal Actions) 
of the TFEU, which correspond to the affirmation of the general prohibition of discrimination 
on grounds of nationality and prohibit all restrictions and discriminations between goods, 
persons, services and capital dependent on their nationality, establishment, or national 
origin. The CJEU has always interpreted the concept of nationality as citizenship of a Member 
State and the two terms, nationality and citizenship, are often used interchangeably.2 
 
As far as gender is concerned, according to Art. 157, par. 1, TFEU ‘Each Member State shall 
ensure that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers for equal work or work of 
equal value is applied’. The Court of Justice has interpreted this provision broadly and as 
having direct effect, both vertical and horizontal.3 Moreover, thanks to secondary law, the 
principle of equal treatment has been extended to all matters of employment and occupation, 
such as access to employment and working conditions, statutory and occupational social 
security schemes, self-employed activities and even in the agricultural field. 
                                                 
1 Case C-122/96, Saldanha, 2 October 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:458; Case C-224/98, D’Hoop, 11 July 2002, 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:432.  
2 Case C-192/99, Kaur, 20 February 2001, ECLI:EU:C:2001:106; Case C-145/04, Kingdom of Spain v. United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 12 September 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:543. 
3 Case 43/75, Defrenne, 8 April 1976, points 7/15, ECLI:EU:C:1976:56.  
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Table 1. Overview of the scope and effects of Articles 18 and 157 TFEU 
Article Grounds Nature 
Application 
Direct effect 
EU level National level 
 
 
18 
Nationality 
Prohibition of 
discrimination, 
and legal basis 
for action by EU 
legislature  
Applies to all 
EU acts, 
regardless of 
the matter 
Applies to 
national 
provisions in 
situations 
‘governed by 
EU law’ 
YES - Vertical and 
horizontal effects 
157 Sex 
Prohibition of 
discrimination, 
and legal basis 
for action by EU 
legislature 
Applies to all 
EU acts, 
regardless of 
the matter 
Applies to 
national 
provisions in 
situations 
‘governed by 
EU law’ 
YES - Vertical and 
horizontal effects 
 
1.1.2. The new anti-discrimination provisions 
 
The Treaties of Amsterdam and Lisbon enlarged the social scope of EU anti-discrimination 
law by adding further rules governing discrimination. The first instance of development of 
anti-discrimination law was the introduction of Art. 19 TFEU (former 13 TEC) in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Art. 19 TFEU endows the Council with the power to combat 
discrimination; it does not prohibit discrimination itself, but gives the Council the power to 
act against discrimination based on an exhaustive list of grounds. Although hostility towards 
discrimination on those grounds can be implicitly inferred from the rule, this is not sufficient 
to confer direct obligations on Member States and, even less, on their citizens. 
Furthermore, Art. 19 TFEU does not assign new competence, but powers, which must be 
exercised ‘within the limits of the powers conferred by them upon the Union’ and ‘without 
prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties’. This last clause means that Art. 19 TFEU 
cannot be used as a legal basis in the presence of a special rule in the Treaty and that it has 
a residual application compared to all other rules of the Treaty and not only with respect to 
those specifically related to discrimination in certain specific sectors. 
A second development was introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The first two titles of the ‘new’ 
Treaty on the European Union include numerous references to the prohibition of 
discrimination and the principle of equality. Moreover, for the first time Art. 2 TEU includes 
equality as one of the values (previously called principles) on which the Union is based and 
specifies that non-discrimination and equality between men and women are characteristics 
which all Member States of the European Union have in common. The subsequent Art. 3, par. 
2 TEU replaces Art. 2 TEU and it both modifies and enlarges the aims of the Union. The Treaty 
now envisages the combating of social exclusion and discrimination, and once again promotes 
equality between women and men.3 Thus, equality, the fight against discrimination, and 
equality between women and men are now considered both fundamental values of the Union 
and objectives the Union should pursue in all its policies. There are in fact two provisions 
which specifically refer to the principle of equality: Art. 4, par. 2 TEU and Art. 9 TEU. The 
first provision establishes the obligation for the Union to respect equality among the Member 
States before the Treaties and to respect their national identity. On the other hand, Title II 
Discrimination(s) as emerging from petitions received 
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of Art. 9 TEU, which deals with democratic principles, refers to the Union's citizens stating 
that: ‘In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, 
who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies […].’ 
Finally, a completely new provision was inserted, i.e. Art. 10 TFEU, which contains a 
mainstreaming principle whereby all EU policies are bound not only to uphold non-
discrimination on the grounds specified therein - i.e. the same as those contained in Art. 19 
TFEU - but also to help to eliminate discrimination. This provision thus requires that all Union 
policies must not only avoid discrimination for the reasons set out, but must also contribute 
to the elimination of such discrimination. Therefore, this is neither a prohibition of 
discrimination (as in Art. 18 TFEU), nor a provision attributing competence (as in Art. 19 
TFEU), but rather a provision requiring that discrimination be combated in all areas of the 
Union's policies and activities. The concept of mainstreaming, which appeared and developed 
widely in the sector of gender discrimination, is now extended to all forms of discrimination 
which are expressly mentioned in EU law. However, this provision does not include nationality 
as citizenship, which continues to be regulated by specific provisions. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Overview of the scope and effects of new anti-discrimination provisions 
 
 
Article 
Grounds Nature 
Application 
Direct effect 
EU level 
National 
level 
ART. 3(3) 
TEU 
General provision 
 
Sex 
Aim of the 
European Union   
Applies to all 
EU 
institutions 
 
- 
 
No 
 
 
9 TEU 
Nationality 
Equal treatment 
requirement 
Applies to all 
EU 
institutions 
- 
 
YES - Vertical 
 
 
 
10 TFEU 
Sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, 
disability, age or 
sexual 
orientation 
Mainstreaming 
principle 
Applies to all 
EU 
institutions 
No No 
 
 
19 TFEU 
Sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, 
religion or belief, 
disability, age, 
sexual 
orientation 
Legal basis for 
action by EU 
legislature. No 
prohibition  
Applies to all 
EU 
institutions 
No No 
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1.1.3. Non-discrimination under Article 21 of the CFR  
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU acquired the same status as the Treaties on 1 
December 2009 and rapidly became the primary reference source of the three-pronged 
system of EU fundamental rights delineated by Article 6 TEU. Its Title III (Articles 20 to 26) 
is devoted to ‘Equality’ and contains a two-paragraph provision on ‘Non-Discrimination’ 
(Article 21). This is preceded by a broadly formulated provision on ‘Equality before the law’ 
(Article 20) of which the former is ‘a particular expression’.  Moreover, Title III lays down 
provisions targeting specific dimensions of the principle of equal treatment, notably the 
respect for cultural, religious and linguistic diversity (Article 22), equality between women 
and men (Article 23), and the protection of minor children, the elderly and persons with 
disabilities (Articles 24, 25 and 26 respectively). 
Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty there was no written catalogue of EU 
fundamental rights. Yet, the CJEU had granted protection to some of these rights through a 
non-written source, the general principles of EU law, which the Court itself can identify and 
reconstruct taking into account also the ECHR and the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States (Art. 6(3) TEU). Article 20 CFR therefore codifies the case law of the CJEU 
on the principle of equality. Similarly, Article 21(1) CFR, insofar as the prohibition on grounds 
of sex, age and nationality are concerned, and Article 23(1) CFR, with respect to equal pay 
between men and women, reassert general principles established by the CJEU. By contrast, 
the remaining provisions in the ‘Equality’ Title are largely innovative with respect to the pre-
Lisbon legal framework.4  
At present, Article 6(3) TEU confirms the possibility for the CJEU to draw the protection of 
fundamental rights (also) from the general principles of EU law. Yet, as anticipated, in recent 
years the Charter has progressively become the first reference source. At the same time, the 
Court has relied on its case law on the general principles to interpret the provisions of the 
Charter drawing on them and to address general questions such as the scope of application 
of the Charter or the capacity of (some of) its provisions to have direct effect.  Accordingly, 
the case law on general principles in the field of equality and non-discrimination will not be 
the object of a separate analysis in this study. 
 
1.1.4. Nature and effects of Article 21 CFR 
 
Whilst the second paragraph of Article 21 CFR, which prohibits nationality discrimination, 
merely replicates Article 18(1) TFEU, the first paragraph lays down a broader list of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination as compared to Article 19 TFEU. This list encompasses sex, race, 
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any 
other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age, sexual 
orientation and nationality. 
 
Moreover, the formulation of Article 21(1) CFR clearly indicates that this list is not exhaustive. 
This should not imply however that, whatever cause of differentiated treatment could be 
caught under this provision, any meaningful distinction between Articles 20 and 21 CFR would 
disappear. The grounds mentioned indeed refer to personal characteristics that also have a 
social dimension, notably being the cause of prejudice or of stigmatisation. It is ultimately 
for the Court to establish whether other grounds can be relevant under that provision. This 
is not only a matter of interpretation of the Charter, it also calls into question societal choices, 
                                                 
4 As regards the protection of children rights, some reference could be found in pre-Lisbon case law: see, in 
particular, Case C-540/03, 27 June 2006, Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, para. 58 and Case C-244/06, 
14 February 2008, Dynamic Medien, ECLI:EU:C:2008:85, para. 41. 
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which must be consistent with the values underlying the EU legal order. So far the CJEU has 
not expanded the list. By contrast, it considered that under EU law sickness and obesity do 
not amount to autonomous grounds of non-discrimination: they only become relevant where 
they imply a condition that can be qualified as disability discrimination.5  
 
As is clearly stated by Article 6(1) TEU and Article 51(2) CFR, the Charter does not empower 
the EU legislature to adopt measures aimed at ensuring the respect of the fundamental rights 
granted therein, or to promote their application. Rather, the Charter lays down limits for 
action of the EU legislature, as well as for the Member States ‘only when they are 
implementing EU law’ (see Article 51(1) CFR and section 1.2.2 below). Thus, Article 21 CFR 
prohibits discrimination on certain grounds (not exhaustively listed) which both the EU 
legislature (when exercising the powers conferred by the Treaties) and the Member States 
(when they ‘implement’ EU law) have to respect. However, Article 21 CFR does not provide 
any legal basis for EU legislation in the field the Charter and can be invoked only within EU 
competences.6 In other words, whilst all the grounds mentioned by Article 21(1) CFR set a 
limit to EU action (insofar as EU acts shall not contain provisions that discriminate on these 
grounds), the Union may not validly enact legislation aimed at combating discrimination 
based on grounds mentioned in Article 21(1) CFR, or Article 19 TFEU (namely, colour, social 
origin, genetic features, language, political or any other opinion, membership of a national 
minority, property, birth)7. This means that EU Member States have primary responsibility 
to tackle these forms of discrimination. Even the duty of ‘promotion’, laid down in Article 51 
CFR, does not constitute a sufficient basis for EU action aimed at promoting the effectiveness 
of Article 21. In other words, it does not seem plausible to base an action (under Article 265 
TFEU) for failure of the EU legislature to enact measures aimed at promoting the Charter on 
the competences conferred on the Union by the Treaties. 
 
The Charter provides a reference point for EU legislation which shall not contain provisions 
contrary to Article 21 CFR, read in combination with Article 52(1) CFR (laying down the 
requirements that limitation to fundamental rights must satisfy). Importantly, Article 21 CFR 
acts as a basis for overseeing all other measures adopted by the institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies of the Union and not only the EU anti-discrimination legislation. However, its 
role is different under the two alternative scenarios. Where the enactment of EU anti-
discrimination legislation is at issue the EU legislature must make provisions that contribute, 
in a consistent manner, to the achievement of equal treatment in a certain field.8 By contrast, 
where equal treatment is not the primary purpose the EU legislature must refrain from 
introducing provisions that are discriminatory. 9  
                                                 
5 See, respectively, Case C-13/05 Chacón Navas, cit., and Case C-354/13 FOA (ex parte Kaltoft), 18 December 
2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2463, paras. 31-40 and 58-60. 
6 The explanation of Article 21(1) CFR deals with this. It makes clear that the EU legislator may not rely on this 
provision to adopt legislation that cannot be based on Article 19 TFEU, which expressly empowers the Union to take 
provisions aimed at combating discrimination (only) on grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or personal 
opinions, disability, sexual orientation and age. Reference is made to the Explanation relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), which must be taken in due account in the interpretation and application of 
the Charter (see arts. 6(1) and 52(7) CFR). 
7 One can apply, by analogy, the reasoning developed by the Court of Justice in Case C-354/13 FOA (ex parte 
Kaltoft), of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2463, para. 36: ‘the scope of Directive 2000/78 should not be 
extended by analogy beyond the discrimination based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 thereof’.  
8 In Case C-236/09 ASBL Test-Achats, 1 March 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:100, the CJEU declared the invalidity of 
Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/113/EC, on equal treatment between men and women in the access to goods and 
services, which allowed the Member States to introduce proportionate differences in individuals’ premiums and 
benefits where the use of sex was a determining factor in the assessment of risks. The Court found that this provision 
was likely to impede the achievement of the very objective of the Directive, and it was therefore incompatible with 
Articles 21 and 23 of the Charter. 
9 In Case C-356/12, Glatzel, 12 May 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2013:505, the CJEU upheld the validity of a provision of 
Directive 2006/126/EC on driving licenses prescribing a requirement of minimum visual acuity for the worse eye for 
drivers of certain vehicles. The compatibility of this provision with Article 21 CFR was challenged on the ground that 
it puts in a disadvantageous position persons suffering from a peculiar visual disability whereby binocular acuity 
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As far as Member States are concerned the Charter is applicable only if there is an EU law 
rule, other than the Charter provision allegedly violated, which governs the situation in 
question. This means that, in order to trigger the application of EU fundamental rights, it is 
not sufficient to claim that a fundamental right granted by the Charter was violated by a 
Member State. Rather, there must be a rule of EU primary or secondary law, other than the 
fundamental right allegedly violated, that is directly relevant to the case.10 If such different 
EU law rule exists the case falls within the scope of EU fundamental rights and Member State 
action11 involved may be reviewed against the Charter. Such rule may be one of the EU anti-
discrimination directives, as was the case in Kücükdeveci. In this respect it must be noted, 
however, that the anti-discrimination directives cannot trigger the application of the Charter 
- in cases falling within their material scopes - in relation to instances of discrimination based 
on grounds additional to those targeted by the directives themselves. Indeed, the Court made 
it clear that ‘the scope of Directive 2000/78 should not be extended by analogy beyond the 
discrimination based on the grounds listed exhaustively in Article 1 thereof’.12 The same 
conclusion should apply to other anti-discrimination directives.  
 
Such a limit to the application of the Charter is a corollary of the principle of conferral, which 
would be put at risk if EU fundamental rights - being cross-sectoral by their very nature - 
could be invoked against Member State action by simply claiming their violation.13  Since the 
situation shall be ‘governed’ by EU law, the Treaty provisions that merely confer on the Union 
the power to adopt anti-discrimination legislation do not, by themselves, trigger the 
application of the Charter. By contrast, Article 21(1) CFR may be relied on in combination 
with an EU anti-discrimination directive where a case falls within the latter’s scope (see for 
instance CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria).14 It could also be relied on in a situation which falls 
outside the scope of EU anti-discrimination legislation, provided that another EU law rule is 
directly relevant to the case (see for instance Léger).15 
 
Finally, the Charter may be applied also against private parties. As a rule, violations of the 
fundamental rights by private parties16 do not fall, as such, within the scope of the Charter. 
This can be inferred from its Article 51(1), which only refers to the Union and the Member 
States (when they ‘implement’ EU law) as the addressees of the duty to respect the 
fundamental rights granted in the Charter. This does not mean that EU law, including the 
                                                 
meets the threshold, whereas the weaker eye does not. The Court found that the contested provision did not breach 
Article 21, read in conjunction with Article 52(1), because ‘[the EU legislature] has weighed the requirements of 
road safety and the right of persons affected by a visual disability to non-discrimination in a manner which cannot 
be regarded as disproportionate in relation to the objectives pursued’. 
10 A. Rosas, When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights applicable at the national level?, Jurisprudencija– 
Jurisprudence, 2012, 19(4), p. 1269–1288. See also para. 10 of the new Recommendations of the Court of Justice 
to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of judicial proceedings (2016/C 439/01).  
11 On the relevance of the Charter with respect to private conducts, see below in this section. 
12 See FOA (ex parte Kaltoft), cit., para. 36. See also, similarly, Chacón Navas, cit., para. 56, and Case C-303/06, 
Coleman, 17 July 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:415, para. 46. 
13 As is well known, in the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Case C-617/10, Åkeberg Fransson, 26 February 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:280, the CJEU affirmed that Article 51(1) of the Charter codifies its pre-Lisbon case law on the 
scope of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law. Accordingly, there is ‘implementation’ of EU law ‘in all 
situations governed by European Union law, but not outside such situations’, or, in other words, when national 
legislation ‘falls within the scope of [EU] law’. 
14 Case C-83/14, Chez Razpredelenie Bulgaria, 16 July 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:480. 
15 See Annex II for a concise analysis of each situation where the CFR may be invoked against MS, coupled with 
examples drawn from the CJEU’s case law. For a more comprehensive analysis, see the study by E. Spaventa, The 
Interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: the Dilemma of Broader or Stricter Application of 
the Charter to National Measures, European Parliament, 2016. 
16 It is worth recalling that the Court has endorsed a broad notion of ‘State’, which encompasses the legislature, the 
executive power and the judiciary, and any central and local public authorities. It also includes ‘a body, whatever 
its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public 
service under the control of the State and has for that purpose special powers beyond those which result from the 
normal rules applicable in relations between individuals’ (see, for instance, Case C-282/10, Dominguez, 24 January 
2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:33). 
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Charter, is irrelevant. Since EU anti-discrimination legislation applies both to public law and 
private law relationships, the reaction against a private party that discriminates against 
someone in a field covered by that EU legislation will be based on the national legislation 
implementing it. However, if the conduct of the private party is in breach of that national 
legislation, EU law will remain in the background. By contrast, the situation is different when 
that private party acts in compliance with national legislation that is discriminatory. The CJEU 
affirmed that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age, as enshrined in Article 21(1) 
CFR, ‘is sufficient in itself to confer on individuals an individual right which they may invoke 
as such’.17 Thus, in cases involving implementation of EU law, the prohibition of age 
discrimination in Article 21(1) CFR can be relied on by a private party (e.g. an employee) 
before a national court in the context of a dispute against another private party (e.g. the 
employer), in order to obtain the disapplication of conflicting national legislation. In practical 
terms, a private party (the employer, in our example) is subject to the effect of the Charter 
as if s/he were formally bound to respect it.  
 
Prior to the recognition of the legally binding status of the Charter the Court had already 
reached this conclusion in relation to the prohibition of age discrimination as a general 
principle of EU law.18 In Mangold,19 Kücükdeveci,20 and Dansk Industri21 the CJEU instructed 
the referring judges to disapply national legislation in contrast with the general principle 
prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age, even though the main proceedings involved 
only private parties (the employee against his employer).  
 
Although the Court referred only to the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of age, 
other grounds mentioned in Article 21(1) CFR may similarly entail direct horizontal effect. 
Clearly, it is ultimately up to the Court to establish this. Indeed, based on its pre-Lisbon case 
law on the general principle of non-discrimination, it is quite safe to argue that at least the 
prohibition to discriminate on the grounds of sex and nationality has that effect.  
 
  
                                                 
17 Case C-176/12, Association de Médiation Sociale, 15 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2. The preliminary ruling in 
Association de Médiation Sociale originated from a case on the right of workers to information and consultation 
within the undertaking, granted by Article 27 CFR. It is nonetheless relevant to this analysis, because the Court 
compared Article 27 to Article 21(1) in order to affirm that the former, unlike the latter, cannot entail direct effect. 
18 See below Annex III for an extensive analysis of the case law of the CJEU on the prohibition of age discrimination 
and on its effects against private parties.  
19 Case C-144/04, 22 November 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709. 
20 Case C-555/07, 19 January 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21. 
21 Case C-441/14, 19 April 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278. 
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Table 3. Prohibited grounds of discrimination under Articles 19 TFEU and 21 CFR 
Grounds Art. 19 TFEU Art. 21 CFR 
 
Sex 
  
Race   
Colour X  
Ethnic origin    
Social origin X  
Genetic features X  
Language X  
Religion or belief   
Political or any other opinion X  
Membership of a national minority X  
Property X  
Birth X  
Age   
Disability   
Sexual orientation   
Other grounds 
X  
(closed list) 
  
(open list) 
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Table 4. Overview of the scope and effects of Article 21 CFR 
Grounds Nature 
Application 
Direct effect 
Key actors for 
implementation 
EU level National level 
 
Non-
exhaustive 
list! 
 
sex 
 
race 
 
colour 
 
ethnic or 
social origin 
 
genetic 
features 
 
language 
 
religion or 
belief 
 
political or 
any other 
opinion 
 
membership 
of a national 
minority 
 
property 
 
birth 
 
disability 
 
age 
 
nationality 
 
sexual 
orientation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Only 
prohibition 
 
No legal basis 
for EU action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All EU acts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In situations 
‘governed by 
EU law’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
YES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shared competence 
for grounds covered 
by both Article 21 
and specific Treaty 
legal bases (e.g. 
Arts. 18, 19 and 157 
TFEU). 
 
Primary 
responsibility of the 
Member States for 
grounds mentioned 
only by Article 21 
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1.2. Non-discrimination under ‘second-generation’ directives 
 
Based on Articles 19 and 157 TFEU, special implementation provisions have been enacted, 
exclusively dedicated to combat discrimination and to implement the principle of equal 
treatment. A system of concepts, exceptions, remedies and sanctions is included. 
 
The adoption of measures according to Art. 19(1) TFEU requires that a special legislative 
procedure be followed in which the Council must act unanimously after approval by the 
European Parliament. The type of procedure justifies why it is important that a specific legal 
basis envisaged by the Treaty should be used where this exists. This applies to Art. 157 TFEU 
on the prohibition of discrimination in employment on grounds of sex. There is a potential 
overlap between this ground of discrimination and its material scope with Art. 19 TFEU, which 
includes sex as one of the grounds of discrimination. The relationship between the two rules 
should be resolved with Art. 157 TFEU prevailing, as it requires the ordinary legislative 
procedure under which the European Parliament is clearly given a decisive role which 
envisages qualified majority voting in the Council. 
 
Under Article 19(2) TFEU the basic principles of incentive measures can be adopted with the 
ordinary legislative procedure. This provision does not alter the nature of Art. 19 TFEU, which 
remains a rule related to powers, but it does allow the adoption of incentive measures 
pursuant to ordinary legislative procedures, excluding any harmonisation. Among the acts 
that can be adopted based on this second paragraph are action programmes, i.e. annual or 
multi-year instruments the Union uses to fund various activities on the basis of certain 
priorities and guidelines. The 2014-2020 Action Programme, Rights, Equality and Citizenship 
Programme, is currently underway for the period 2014 to 2020.22 These activities can be 
carried out by the Commission, by the Member States or by private parties through decisions 
taken by the Management Committee which establishes an annual programme implemented 
by the Commission through the publication of notices or contracts. The Council can also adopt 
different acts, since the only condition laid down by Art. 19(2) is that the reference made is 
to incentive measures and not harmonisation measures.  
 
With a view to implementing Art. 19 TFEU, a first package of measures was adopted. It 
comprised Directive 2000/43/EC, which implemented the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin23, and Directive 2000/78/EC which 
establishes a general framework for equal treatment in employment and working 
conditions.24 The directives implementing Art. 19 TFEU are called ‘second-generation 
directives’, since compared to those previously adopted concerning discrimination on the 
grounds of sex, they regulate a comprehensive system of protection against discrimination 
which was, for the first time, structured, detailed and based on the abundant case law the 
Court of Justice had developed in the field of discrimination on grounds of nationality and 
sex. The result was a codification of the concepts of discrimination (direct, indirect and 
harassment) and of a three-phase system of application of the rule. This allowed comparison 
between two similar situations, the verification of the existence of a disadvantage and the 
exclusion of a justification for discriminatory treatment (see Annex I for further details). 
 
The directives, which are identical in many parts, contain comprehensive regulations that 
identify a system of broad protection, with reference to the notion of discrimination, sanctions 
                                                 
22 Regulation 1381/2013 of 17 December 2013 Establishing a Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme for the 
period 2014 to 2020, O.J. L 354/62 (2013). 
23 OJ L 180, 19 July 2000, 22-26. 
24 OJ L 303, 2 December 2000, 16-22. 
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and remedies, including the locus standi of collective subjects and the shift of the burden of 
proof.25 Directive 2000/43 deals exclusively with discrimination on the grounds of race and 
ethnicity, while Directive 2000/78 concerns all the other grounds with the exclusion of sex 
(religion and belief, disability, age, sexual orientation). Moreover, Directive 2000/43 has a 
wider material scope of application, while the Directive 2000/78 is limited to the work sector. 
 
The European Commission in 2008 put forward a proposal aiming to extend the scope of 
Directive 2000/78/EC to the same fields already covered by Directive 2000/43/EC. However, 
several Member States expressed their opposition to the proposal and the Council has not 
yet been able to reach the majority needed to approve it.26. Despite slight differences among 
MSs’ positions, their opposition is mainly grounded on the following reasons: failure to respect 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; lack of legal clarity; existing case law 
(including infringement proceedings stemming from the other EU anti-discrimination 
directives); the need for an impact assessment (a cost-benefit analysis and an assessment 
of the burden the proposal would impose on private businesses); and the scope of the 
directive (certain delegations being opposed to the inclusion of social protection and 
education).27 While during the Italian Presidency in the second half of 2014 a consensus was 
close to being reached, recently the opposition side appears to have become larger. It is 
worth mentioning that Germany has been against the proposal since its publication, 
influencing the whole negotiation process. Complete refusal of the proposal was even part of 
the government coalition agreement in the Merkel I government. While the Merkel II coalition 
agreement does not contain this point, the government's position at EU level has not 
changed.28 However, the Commission has confirmed its original proposal and a scrutiny 
reservation on any changes thereto. Negotiations within the Council are still going on, but 
with still different views among Member States as shown in the progress reports published 
by the Council.29  
 
The package of measures to implement Art. 19 TFEU was largely inspired by the legislation 
and action programmes adopted to implement Art. 157 TFEU. In turn, the Directives of 2000 
created the need to amend the law on discrimination on the grounds of sex. Directive 
2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 was thus adopted.30 Although the need for this change is 
to be found in Art. 19 TFEU, Directive 2002/73/EC has its legal basis in Art. 157 TFEU as a 
special rule according to Art. 19 TFEU. Later, in 2006, Directive 76/207/EEC was the subject 
of another legislative regulatory intervention.31 The origins of this intervention are entirely 
different from the previous ones. It came about in the wake of the European institutions’ 
activities aimed at improving and simplifying the state of EU law.32 The legislative activism 
on the subject ended with the adoption of Directive 2004/113/EC which implemented the 
principle of equal treatment between men and women as regards access to and supply of 
                                                 
25 Case C-415/10, Meister, 19 April 2012, ECLI:C:2012:217; Case C-246/09, Bulicke, 8 July 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:418; Case C-429/12, Pohl, 16 January 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:12. 
26 Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, COM (2008)426 of 2 July 2008. 
27 The progress on negotiations are reported in regular progress report: see the most recent Council docs. No. 
14284/16, 10916/16, 14282/16 and 5428/17 of 14 February 2017. 
28 M. Privot, A. Pall, Three ways to unlock the EU anti-discrimination bill, 23 December 2014, www.euobserver.com.  
29 Progress Report, Doc. Cons. No. 14284/16 of 22 November 2016, p. 3 
30 Directive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, OJ L 269/15 (2002). 
31 Directive 2006/54/EC of 5 July 2006, on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), envisaged the recasting of the 
normative content of Directives 75/117/EEC, 76/207/EEC, 86/378/EEC and 97/80/EC, which were at the same time 
repealed with effect from 15 August 2009, OJ L 204/23 (2006). 
32 Unlike consolidation and codification, recasting makes it possible both to bring together regulatory acts relating 
to the same matter in a single text and to make any changes required to the regulations based, for example, on the 
fundamental judgments of the Court of Justice. 
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goods and services.33 Directive 2004/113/EC has its legal basis in Art. 19 TFEU and aims to 
extend the scope of the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex to sectors other 
than work. The different legal bases, therefore, tend to generate different regulations while 
having the same object, which undermines any attempt at simplification the institutions 
wished to pursue. For example, the notions of discrimination are reiterated in both directives, 
repeating the definitions provided by the directives of 2000 as well as the provisions on the 
judgment of discrimination. 
 
It is worth mentioning that as far as ‘nationality’ is concerned there is no secondary rule that 
expressly lays down rules on the application of the prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of nationality.34 At the same time, Directive 2000/43/EC, which implements equal treatment 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, expressly excludes its application to differences of 
treatment based on nationality (Article 3) unless this leads to indirect discrimination 
on grounds of racial or ethnic origin (annual report of the European Commission on the 
implementation of Directive 2000/43/EC). This means that as far as the legal instruments 
required by the latest generation of directives is concerned, these are not applicable per se 
to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality. National legislators can envisage 
it, but it is not required by the obligations of the European Union.35 
 
For EU citizens as well as for those categories of third country nationals to whom the 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality applies, the issue becomes that of 
which procedural rules are applicable. In this case too, in fact, as for the discrimination on 
grounds of nationality of EU citizens, there is no specific anti-discrimination provision obliging 
Member States to adopt a real system of protection and remedies to respond to the 
discrimination suffered.36 Hence, according to Articles 19 TEU and 47 CFR the remedies 
applicable will be the national ones already in place to protect similar rights recognised by 
domestic law, assessed in the light of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. It 
follows, therefore, that in the absence of any regulatory requirement for procedural 
instruments to enforce the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, national 
procedural rules will apply. 
 
As already stated, when EU anti-discrimination legislation is applicable Article 21 CFR also is. 
When EU anti-discrimination legislation is not applicable Article 21 CFR applies only if the 
case involves an alleged discrimination stemming from an EU act (regardless of the matter) 
or, at the national level, a situation ‘governed by EU law’. If the case involves alleged 
discrimination in a field where there are no directly relevant EU law rules (other than the 
Charter), Article 21 CFR is not applicable. Treaty provisions merely conferring on the Union 
the power to enact legislation on the matter concerned cannot trigger the application of the 
Charter.37 
  
                                                 
33 Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men 
and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373/37 (2004). 
34 The jurisdiction provided for in par. 2 of art. 18 was in fact never exercised for this purpose.  
35Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck, 14 December 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:437, para. 12. For a confirmation of the 
principle on non-discrimination, see Case C-246/09, Bulicke v Deutsche Büro Service gmbh, 8 July 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:418.  
36 Case C-291/09, Franscesco Guarnieri & Cie, 7 April 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:217, para. 20; Case C-571/10, 
Kamberaj, 24 April 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:233. 
37 See below in Annex IV on the interplay between EU sources on antidiscrimination the Charter.  
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2. RELEVANT GROUNDS OF PROHIBITED DISCRIMINATION 
 
KEY ISSUES 
 Analysis of the specific grounds of prohibited discrimination, taking into account 
the plurality of EU law anti-discrimination sources (highlighted in Chapter I), 
with a view to clarifying the different degrees of protection that those grounds 
enjoy or could enjoy. 
 Analysis of the main judgments through which the CJEU contributed to shaping 
the scope of EU law anti-discrimination provisions, often embracing an extensive 
interpretation. 
 
2.1. Interpreting the different grounds in different legal sources 
 
Neither the Treaties nor the Charter or the EU anti-discrimination legislation provide a 
definition of the grounds of prohibited discrimination they mention. It is reasonable, however, 
that their meaning does not vary depending on the source referred. EU anti-discrimination 
directives are based on the Treaty provisions on non-discrimination and the explanation of 
Article 21 CFR points out that paragraph 1 of this provision ‘draws on [inter alia] Article 19 
[TFEU]’, whereas paragraph 2 ‘corresponds’ to Article 18(1) TFEU. 
 
An important parameter of interpretation is provided by the case law of the ECtHR on Article 
14 ECHR. The explanation of Article 21 CFR indeed points out that ‘[i]n so far as [this 
provision] corresponds to Article 14 of the ECHR, it applies in compliance with it’. This is in 
line with Article 52(3) CFR, according to which the scope and meaning of Charter rights which 
correspond to rights granted by the ECHR (‘corresponding rights’) shall be the same as those 
laid down by this Convention, although Union law may provide a more extensive protection. 
In other words, the ECHR sets a minimum floor with respect to the protection to be granted 
to corresponding rights.  
 
Based on the formulation of Article 21(1) CFR and Article 14 ECHR38 the overlap concerns 
discrimination based on sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, social 
origin, property, birth and, arguably, membership of a national minority (although the 
expression used in the ECHR is ‘association to a national minority’). Interestingly, the 
explanation of Article 52(3) CFR points out that ‘[t]he meaning and the scope of the 
[corresponding] rights are determined not only by the text of [the Convention and of its 
Protocols], but also by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights’. Based on that 
case law discrimination on grounds of genetic features must be added to the list39 and, more 
generally, the overlap between the two provisions may further evolve through the case law 
of the two courts. 
                                                 
38 Article 14 (‘Prohibition of discrimination’) states as follows: ‘The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth 
in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or 
other status.’ 
39 In G.N. and Others v. Italy, the European Court of Human Rights, relying inter alia on Article 21(1), considered 
that instances of discrimination based on genetic features may be caught by Article 14 ECHR: whilst that ground is 
not explicitly mentioned, also Article 14 ECHR does not contain an exhaustive list of prohibited grounds. No. 4134/05, 
01/12/2009, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:1201JUD004313405. 
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It is worth pointing out that the prohibition of non-discrimination laid down by Article 21 CFR 
is not an absolute. Based on a combined reading with Article 52(1) CFR,40 a discriminatory 
treatment is compatible with Article 21(1) CFR when it: has a legal basis, respects the 
essence of the prohibition, genuinely meets objectives of general interest recognised by the 
Union or the need to protect the rights or freedoms of others, and entails restrictions that do 
not exceed the limits of what is necessary and appropriate to attain its stated purpose. If the 
specific ground concerned is protected also under Article 14 ECHR, attention must be paid 
also to the case law of the ECtHR because the explanation of Article 52(3) CFR points out 
that the duty of parallel interpretation extends to limitations. 
 
Concerning limitations, it must be stressed, however, that EU anti-discrimination legislation 
contains specific provisions on this. The test laid down by Article 52(1) CFR is therefore the 
primary reference with respect to allegedly discriminatory conducts that fall within the scope 
of the Charter,41 though not within the scope of a specific EU anti-discrimination directive.42 
 
2.2. Nationality 
 
As regards the prohibition of nationality discrimination, now laid down by Article 18(1) TFEU, 
the CJEU has consistently interpreted the concept of ‘nationality’ as ‘citizenship of an EU 
Member State’.43 Likewise, the concept of ‘worker of the Member State’” under Art. 45 TFEU 
has been interpreted as referring only to a worker who is also a ‘national’ of a Member State. 
 
It is important to stress that the purpose of the prohibition in Art. 18 TFEU is not to ensure 
the equality of citizens of the Union but to ensure equal treatment of EU citizens who move 
to another Member State, thus exercising their right to free movement as guaranteed by EU 
law. According to the Court, this principle precludes a Member State from granting a right to 
an EU citizen on condition that s/he is resident on the territory when such a condition is not 
required for that state’s own citizens. By contrast, the prohibition does not imply that all EU 
citizens should be treated equally in every situation, rather it requires that nationality should 
not be a barrier to their movement, to achieve a genuine internal market and a true area of 
freedom, security and justice. Thus, for instance, Art. 18 TFEU cannot be invoked to challenge 
discrimination arising only from the existence of differences in the legislation of the Member 
States that do not limit the enjoyment of rights under EU law.44 Nor may it validly be relied 
on against discrimination, i.e. the inevitable different effects produced by harmonisations, 
that are a consequence of differences in the previous state of national regulations.45 
 
                                                 
40 This is the general provision of the Charter that lays down the conditions that limitations to the exercise of the 
fundamental rights granted by the Charter shall satisfy: ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms 
recognised by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others’. 
41 On the scope of application of Article 2 1(1) of the Charter, and of the Charter itself, see point 1.2.3 below. 
42 In Léger, the Court checked a national measure transposing Directive 2004/33/EC on technical requirements for 
blood donation against Article 52(1). The national measure provided for a permanent deferral to blood donation for 
men who have had a sexual relations with other men. The court found that the said measure ‘may discriminate 
against homosexuals on grounds of sexual orientation within the meaning of Article 21(1)’. Besides, Article 52(1) 
sets the benchmark against which a discriminatory provision contained in an EU act must be tested, as the Court 
did, for instance, in the already mentioned Glatzel case. See Case C-528/13, Léger, 29 April 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:288, paras. 50-58. 
43 Indeed, the two terms - nationality and citizenship - are often used interchangeably in the CJEU’s case law: see, 
for instance, Kaur, cit. 
44 Case C-177/94, Perfili, 1 February 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:24.  
45 Case 331/88, Fedesa, 13 November 1990, ECLI:EU:C:1990:391.  
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Originally, the prohibition of nationality discrimination was essentially conceived of by the 
Treaties as the driving engine for the creation of the internal market, which is characterised 
by the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital 
between Member States. When these obstacles are based on discriminatory measures they 
fall under the general prohibition in Art. 18 TFEU or in the specific prohibitions laid down by 
the other Treaty provisions on freedom of movement, which prohibit any form of restriction 
on the movement of economic actors. 
 
The CJEU’s generous approach to the scope of the Treaty provisions on free movement46 
implies that also the scope of the prohibition of nationality discrimination within the internal 
market has been interpreted broadly. For instance, the Court included amongst its 
beneficiaries EU citizens who move to another Member State for reasons of tourism or to 
receive medical treatment.47 The prohibition was also applied by the Court to a citizen 
residing in his state of nationality where he pursued an activity falling within the provision of 
services as regulated by Art. 56 TFEU. This offers protection both against the state of 
destination and the country of origin when the entrepreneur operates as a provider of services 
with a ‘Community dimension’.48 The CJEU also specified that rules of criminal law or criminal 
procedure may fall within the scope of the prohibition, even though the Member States have 
exclusive competence on these matters.49 Indeed, EU law sets limits to such competences 
which must neither create discrimination against persons to whom EU law gives the right to 
equal treatment, nor restrict the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law.50 
 
Art. 24 of Directive 2004/38/EC51 now lays down a general provision on equal treatment of 
EU citizens and their family members subject to the limits and conditions set forth in the 
Treaties and secondary law. Member States may apply derogations to the principle of equality 
of treatment in cases of social assistance during the first three months of residence and 
maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training prior to acquisition of the right of 
permanent residence granted to persons other than workers and self-employed persons. 
 
The CJEU has expressly excluded the application of the prohibition of discrimination on the 
ground of nationality to third country nationals (TCNs). In Vatsouras, the CJEU reiterated its 
restrictive interpretation of Article 18(1) TFEU, holding that ‘[this] provision concerns 
situations coming within the scope of [Union] law in which a national of one Member State 
suffers discriminatory treatment in relation to nationals of another Member State solely based 
on his nationality and is not intended to apply to cases of a possible difference in treatment 
between nationals of Member States and nationals of non-member countries’. 52 
 
Both the European Union and the Member States are essentially free to regulate the 
treatment of foreigners in their territory through internal rules or by means of international 
agreements subject to the limitations arising from other international obligations or 
                                                 
46 Cases C-286/82 and C-26/83, Luisi and Carbone, 31 January 1984, ECLI:EU:C:1984:35; Case C-60/00, Carpenter, 
11 July 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434. 
47 Case C-186/87, Cowan, 2 February 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:47. 
48 Case C-368/95, Familiapress, 26 June 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:325. 
49 See Saldanha, cit.; C-323/95, Hayes, 20 March 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:169; Case C-224/00, Commission c. Italian 
Republic, 19 March 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:185; Case C-29/95, Pastoors, 23 January 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:28. 
50 Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, 24 November 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:563.  
51 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, O.J. L 158 2004, 77.  
52 Case C-22/08, Vatsouras, 4 June 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:344. The situation at issue in the case was peculiar, 
because two EU citizens claimed to be the victims of nationality discrimination in relation to a social assistance 
benefit access to which was limited to third country nationals. The CJEU held that ‘Art. 12 EC [now, 18 TFEU] does 
not preclude national rules which exclude nationals of Member States of the European Union from receipt of social 
assistance benefits which are granted to nationals of non-member countries. See also Case C-291/09 Guarnieri, 7 
April 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:217; Kamberaj, cit.  
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constitutional law. In addition to international rules that specifically relate to the treatment 
of foreigners, the rules on human rights have an important role and, as such, do not admit 
distinctions based on citizenship.53 
 
The CFR confirms the same rule. Despite the fact that Art. 21(2) CFR also uses the neutral 
expression ‘nationality’, which, in and of itself, could encompass also third country nationals, 
Art. 52(2) CFR provides that ‘[r]ights recognised by [the] Charter for which provision is made 
in the Treaties shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those 
Treaties’. Moreover, the mention of nationality discrimination in a separate paragraph of Art. 
21 CFR is likely meant to foreclose arguments in favour of broadening the consolidated 
approach of the CJEU.54  
 
The development of the European policy on immigration led to the adoption of several 
directives governing the entry and treatment of specific categories of third country nationals, 
many of which contain an express obligation for the Member States to recognise the right to 
equal treatment. The most important are: Directive 2003/109/EC on so-called long-term 
residents (Art. 21); Directive 2011/98/EU on the so-called single permit (Article 11); 
Directive 2009/50/EC on the blue card of highly skilled workers (Article 14); and Council 
Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for the admission of third 
country nationals for purposes of scientific research (Article 12).  
 
Thus, even though Art. 18 TFEU and the specific Treaty provisions prohibiting nationality 
discrimination in the context of free movement do not apply to third country nationals, many 
obligations now exist which require that states ensure equal treatment of such persons, as 
in the directives on immigration and asylum. Individual prohibitions contained in the 
directives make it possible to assess the discriminatory nature of measures taken against 
TCNs on grounds of their nationality55.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that some categories of TCNs enjoy a special status within EU law. 
The Union, but also individual Member States, have over the years adopted international 
agreements aimed at regulating the movement and treatment of the nationals of the 
contracting states. An even more protected category of third country nationals is that of 
family members of EU citizens who enjoy a right of movement and residence. A special status 
is granted to the family members, dependent on that of the EU citizen, but basically 
assimilated to it thanks to Article 24.1 of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
 
2.3. Sex 
 
The CJEU interpreted Art. 157 TFEU - including the notion of ‘sex’ therein - in an extensive 
way. For instance, whilst the provision was originally meant to protect women, the Court 
referred to ‘sex’ as a neutral notion, so that Article 157 TFEU may be relied on also in cases 
were men are discriminated. At the same time, the Court pointed out that discrimination for 
                                                 
53 ECtHR 12313/86, Moustaquim v. Belgium, 18.02.1991, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1991:0218JUD001231386; 21794/93, C. 
v Belgium, 7.08.1996, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1996:0807JUD002179493, paras. 37-38. 
54 Remarkably, although Article 14 ECHR refers to ‘national origin’, the explanation of Article 21(2) does not qualify 
the two provisions as corresponding rights for the purpose of Article 52(3), nor the ECHR is somehow mentioned as 
a source of inspiration. 
55 The applicability of the former or latter will depend on the appreciation of the Courts, primarily the Court of Justice 
that, in fact, has always applied the various sources in which a prohibition of discrimination is laid down at the same 
time; for instance, on discrimination on grounds of sex, the Court applied the general principle instead of the express 
prohibition in Art. 157 TFEU to allow a wider application of the rule under the Treaty. Case C-149/77, Defrenne II, 
15 June 1978, ECLI:EU:C:1978:130; Cases C-75/82 and C-117/82, Razzouk and Beydoun, 20 March 1984, 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:116; Mangold, cit.    
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pregnancy reasons constitutes sex discrimination because pregnancy is a status peculiar to 
women. Even more interesting is the Court’s interpretation whereby, under EU law, 
discrimination based on sex also covers situations where a person is discriminated because 
he or she intends to undergo, or has undergone, gender reassignment.  
 
In P. v. S.56 the CJEU was requested to clarify whether the dismissal of a transsexual for a 
reason related to a gender reassignment was in contrast with Art. 5(1) of Directive 
76/207/EEC57 which prohibits direct and indirect sex-discrimination between workers. The 
applicant in the main proceedings was a manager in an educational establishment, who, a 
year after having been taken on, informed the Chief Director of the establishment of his 
intention to undergo gender reassignment. After he underwent some minor surgical 
operations he received a notice of dismissal which took effect after surgical gender 
reassignment. After recalling that ‘the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of 
sex is [a] fundamental human rights whose observance the Court has a duty to ensure’, the 
CJEU affirmed that discrimination for reason of gender reassignment constitutes 
discrimination ‘based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned’.58 It 
also added that ‘To tolerate such discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a 
person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and 
which the Court has a duty to safeguard’.59 Accordingly, the Court concluded that ‘Article 
5(1) of the directive precludes dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related to a gender 
reassignment’.60 
 
Later, the Court confirmed this approach in K.B.,61 a case concerning the refusal to award a 
widower's pension to a worker’s partner, on the grounds that only married couples were 
entitled to that pension. There was, therefore, a discrimination between married and non-
married couples regardless of whether the partners were persons of the opposite sex by birth 
or following gender reassignment. Yet, in the Member State concerned (UK), whilst 
transsexuals could undergo gender reassignment surgery through the National Health 
Service, they were precluded from getting married, because only heterosexual marriage was 
admitted and post-operative transsexuals could not obtain the amendment of the data 
concerning their sex in the civil register. Relying also on its judgment in Goodwin v. UK,62 
the CJEU held that national legislation such as that at issue (namely, legislation that does 
not allow to amend the data concerning sex of post-operative transsexuals in the civil 
registers) was discriminatory.  
 
2.4. Race and ethnicity 
 
Both Article 19 TFEU and Directive 2000/43/EC list ethnic origin along with race, thereby 
connecting the word that best evokes physical characteristics (race) with a reference to the 
cultural dimension of the group (ethnicity). ‘Race and ethnicity’ should in effect constitute a 
                                                 
56 Case C-13/94 P. v. S., 30 April 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:170. 
57 Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regard access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, OJ 1976 L 39, 
p. 40. 
58 P. v. S., cit., paras. 19 and 21. 
59 Ibid., para. 22. 
60 Ibid., para. 24. 
61 Case C-117/01 K.B., 7 January 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:7. See also, similarly, Case C-423/04 Sarah Margaret 
Richards, 27 April 2006, ECLI:EU:C:2006:256.  
62 ECtHR, No. 28957/95 Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 11 July 200, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2002:0711JUD002895795. See also ECtHR, No. 25680/94, I. v. United Kingdom, 11 July 2002, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2002:0711JUD002568094 and No. 35968/97 Van Kuck c. Germania, 12 September 2003, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2003:0612JUD003596897. 
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single concept, to avoid situations in which protection is not afforded purely for terminological 
reasons.63 In addition, Art. 21 CFR and Art. 14 ECHR mention colour and membership to a 
national minority,64 which should also be considered when examining instances of alleged 
discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origin.  
 
In CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria65 the applicant complained about not being able to monitor 
her electricity consumption because in her town district the electricity meters had been 
installed much higher than elsewhere. She claimed that such installation was due to the 
circumstance that the district was densely populated by Roma. Since the applicant was not 
Roma herself the national judge doubted whether she could be regarded as a victim of 
discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin under Directive 2000/43/EC and Article 21 CFR. 
The CJEU held that that ‘the principle of equality (...), as recognised by Article 21 [CFR], (...) 
applies not to a particular category of persons but by reference to the grounds mentioned in 
Article 1 of the Directive, so that [it] is intended to benefit also persons who, although not 
themselves a member of the race or ethnic group concerned, nevertheless suffer less 
favourable treatment or a particular disadvantage on one of those grounds’.66  
 
Although in practice it may sometimes be difficult to draw a clear dividing line, racial 
discrimination and religious discrimination are considered separately under EU law. Directive 
2000/43/EC deals with racial discrimination and Directive 2000/78/EC with religious 
discrimination. Even more significantly, Art. 3 of Directive 2000/43/EC expressly points out 
that this directive does not address ‘difference of treatment based on nationality and [that 
it] is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to the entry into and residence 
of third country nationals and stateless persons on the territory of Member States, and to 
any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third country nationals and stateless 
persons concerned’. Recital 13 reinforces this by clarifying that the directive and the 
implementing national legislation applies to nationals of third countries, but they can be 
invoked against migration laws or for discrimination based on nationality.67 
 
It is not always easy to understand whether discrimination is based on nationality or on race 
or ethnic origin, especially in countries which experienced (or are experiencing) a significant 
influx of migrants in more recent times and whose policies do not facilitate the acquisition of 
citizenship.68 Importantly, the directive is applicable when discrimination based on nationality 
also determines indirect discrimination on grounds of race. In Feryn the CJEU qualified as 
discrimination on grounds of racial or ethnic origin the public statement by an employer that 
he would have not recruited ‘migrant workers’.69 This is, apparently, an endorsement of the 
                                                 
63 A similar approach is adopted in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
whose Article 1 defines the concept of racial discrimination by associating the terms race, colour, descent and 
national or ethnic origin. Note also that Recital 6 of Directive 2000/43/EC clarifies that “the European Union rejects 
theories that attempt to determine the existence of separate human races. The use of the term “racial origin” in this 
Directive does not imply an acceptance of such theories”. One of the reasons for the inclusion of this recital was to 
overcome the resistance raised by France that was against the use of the term race to avoid supporting, even 
formally, the theory of the division of humanity into different races. However, the maintenance of the term 
race was regarded as necessary to provide a comprehensive protection. 
64 This ground is addressed separately under 2.6 below.  
65 Case CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, cit. 
66 Ibid., paras. 43 and 56. 
67 Recital 13 provides that “[the] prohibition of discrimination should also apply to nationals of third countries, but 
does not cover differences of treatment based on nationality and is without prejudice to provisions governing the 
entry and residence of third country nationals and their access to employment and to occupation”. 
68 By contrast, it is easier to distinguish between the two grounds those Countries where the people of a different 
race or ethnic origin than that of the majority of the population are also citizens of those Countries. 
69 Case C-54/07, Feryn, 10 July 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:397.  
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orientation that considers discrimination on grounds of nationality, or xenophobia, as one of 
the many variants of racial discrimination and racism.70 
 
From a more technical perspective the exclusion of the application of Directive 2000/43/EC 
to discrimination on grounds of nationality is also justified based on respect for the principle 
of conferral of powers, since Art. 19 TFEU contains an exhaustive list of grounds but does not 
include nationality, which is dealt with separately by Art. 18 TFEU. The prohibition laid down 
by the latter provision has always been understood by the CJEU as referring to discrimination 
on grounds of ‘citizenship’, which in turn has been interpreted restrictively as ‘citizenship of 
one of the EU Member States’. Since Art. 19 TFEU is without prejudice to the other provisions 
of the Treaty, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality continues to be 
exclusively governed by Art. 18 TFEU, with the result that any legal act relating to 
discrimination on grounds of nationality must be based on this Article. 
  
2.5. Language 
 
Language is a prohibited ground of discrimination under Art. 21(1) CFR and, since Art. 14 
ECHR also mentions it, Art. 52(3) CFR applies. Moreover, Art. 22 CFR on ‘Cultural, religious 
and linguistic diversity’ requires the Union to ‘respect cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity’. By contrast, language is not included amongst the grounds targeted by Article 19 
TFEU. Thus, given that the Charter does not empower the EU to adopt legislation, there are 
no (and there cannot be any) EU measures aimed at combating discrimination on grounds of 
language.  
 
However, Directive 2000/43/EC (the Racial Equality Directive) may be applicable to cases 
where an unfavourable treatment based on language turns out to be also an indirect 
discrimination on grounds of race or ethnic origin.71 Moreover, provisions aimed at 
overcoming linguistic hurdles may be contained in EU measures other than anti-
discrimination legislation. For instance, in 2010 the EU adopted a directive requiring Member 
States to ensure that defendants in criminal proceedings are entitled to interpretation and 
translation services in a language they understand.72 It is worth mentioning that regarding 
criminal procedural law the CJEU had already stated that when a MS confers to citizens who 
are resident in a defined area (South Tyrol in the case at stake) the right to require that 
criminal proceedings be conducted in a language other than the principal language of that 
State (German), the same option shall be granted also to ‘nationals of other Member States 
travelling or staying in that area, whose language is the same’.73 According to the Court, 
while the protection of ethno-cultural minority may constitute a legitimate aim to be pursued 
by the state, that aim would not be undermined if the rules at issue were extended to cover 
                                                 
70 Indeed, according to the Durban Declaration of 2001, adopted during the World Conference against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, xenophobia and discrimination against migrants are two of the 
most serious forms of racism in the contemporary age,  
 http://www.un.org/en/durbanreview2009/pdf/DDPA_full_text.pdf. The declaration was reviewed during the 
Geneva Conference held on 20-24 April 2009. 
71 Joint Report on the application of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of 
equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (‘Racial Equality Directive’) and of Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation (‘Employment Equality Directive’); COM (2014)2, 17 January 2014, p. 11. 
72 Directive 2010/64/EU of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, 
OJ L280 2010, 1-7. 
73 Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz, of 24 November 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:563. 
para. 31. 
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German-speaking nationals of other Member States exercising their right to freedom of 
movement.74 
 
In other cases the CJEU has been required to establish the discriminatory nature of language 
requirements in questions concerning the free movement of EU citizens who were workers in 
or enjoyed the right to freely move or reside in another EU country. The leading case in this 
regard is Groener. This case concerned the obligation imposed on lecturers in public 
vocational schools in Ireland to have a certain knowledge of the Irish language.75 In 
particular, the Court had to assess the interpretation of Article 3(1) of Regulation 1612/1968 
(now repealed by Regulation no. 492/2011 with an identical Article 3(1)) allowing Member 
States to apply linguistic requirements not applicable to their own nationals. According to the 
Court a policy adopted to protected a national language which is also the first language of 
that state, ‘must not encroach upon a fundamental freedom such as that of the free 
movement of workers. Therefore, the requirements deriving from measures intended to 
implement such a policy must not in any circumstances be disproportionate in relation to the 
aim pursued and the manner in which they are applied must not bring about discrimination 
against nationals of other Member States’. The Court recognises the importance of education 
for the implementation of such a policy and the key role that teachers have to play, ‘not only 
through the teaching which they provide but also by their participation in the daily life of the 
school and the privileged relationship which they have with their pupils’.76  
 
Where linguistic requirements apply the MSs shall apply them according to the principle of 
non-discrimination. This means, for instance, that MSs may not impose that the linguistic 
knowledge must have been acquired within the national territory.77 Also worth mentioning 
here is the CJEU's case law on the recognition in a Member State of the surname registered 
in another Member State in accordance with different rules than those followed in the former 
state.78 The CJEU affirmed that it is up to the Member States to adopt legislative or 
administrative measures laying down the detailed rules for transcriptions of EU citizens’ 
surnames. However, those rules may be relevant under EU law if they interfere with the 
exercise of the free movement rights conferred on EU citizens by the EU Treaties.79 Yet, 
based on that same case law, such an obstacle would not be - as such - incompatible with 
EU law, on condition that it does not give rise to serious inconvenience at administrative, 
professional and private levels and if it is necessary for the protection of the interests which 
the national rules are designed to secure and is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.80 
 
Another important strand of the CJEU’s case law concerns the right of EU citizens to address 
the EU institutions in any one of the 24 official languages, and to receive answers from the 
institutions in that same language (Article 24(4) TFEU). This led the Court to annul the notice 
of some EPSO competitions, which limited the choice of the second language, as well as 
candidates' language of communication with EPSO, to English, French and German.81  
                                                 
74 Ibid., para. 29. 
75 Case C-379/87, Groener, 28 November 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:599. 
76 Ibid., para. 20. 
77 Case C-281/98, Angonese, 6 June 1998, ECLI:EU:C:2000:296. 
78 Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig and Landratsamt Calw, 30 March 1993, ECLI:EU:C:1993:115 
ECLI:EU:C:1993:115; Case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn e Wardyn, 12 May 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:291; Case C-
148/02, Garcia Avello, 2 October 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, Case C-353/06, Grunkin and Paul, 14 October 2008, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:559, and Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, 22 December 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:806. See below 
par. 3.4.1 for an analysis of these cases related to free movement of EU citizens and recognition of statutes.  
79 Case C-391/09, Runevič-Vardyn e Wardyn, cit., para. 63. 
80 Ibid., paras. 78 and 82. 
81 See EU Trib., Case T-124/13 Italian Republic and Kingdom of Spain v. European Commission, 24 September 2015, 
ECLI:EU:T:2015:690. 
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2.6. National minorities 
 
National minority is a prohibited ground of discrimination according to Art. 21 CFR, but it is 
not mentioned in Art. 19 TFEU. Under EU law this ground therefore enjoys merely a negative 
protection, insofar as the EU and the Member States (‘only when they implement EU law’ 
within the meaning of Art. 51(1) CFR) shall not lay down provisions discriminating against 
individuals on grounds of their belonging to a national minority. However, protection from 
discrimination of persons belonging to national minorities may be granted under Directive 
2000/43/EC on grounds of race and ethnic origin and under Directive 2000/78/EC on the 
grounds of religion or belief.  
 
EU institutions may stimulate the Member States to adopt measures aimed at fostering 
equality and combating discrimination on this ground. Yet, they cannot validly impose such 
measures. Moreover, only when a national act or measure having the purpose or the effect 
of discrimination on grounds of belonging to a national minority falls under the scope of EU 
law, can the EU institutions act against the Member State concerned.82  
 
While the Charter binds the EU and the Member States to respect cultural, religious and 
linguistic diversity and to not discriminate on grounds of belonging to a national minority, it 
is hard to find a legal basis in the Treaties for the adoption of acts specifically addressed at 
national minorities or a duty to adopt such acts. This also applies to minority language rights, 
which are of key importance for the effective protection of all other rights of persons 
belonging to a minority.  
 
The issue is particularly timely in light of the fresh judgment of the EU Tribunal83 annulling 
the decision of the European Commission to refuse registration of a European Citizens' 
Initiative entitled ‘Minority Safepack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’ by 
alleging lack of competence.84 The promoters asked the EU to adopt a set of legal acts aimed 
at improving the protection of persons belonging to national and linguistic minorities and at 
strengthening cultural and linguistic diversity in the Union. In the decision refusing 
registration the European Commission observed that ‘while the respect for rights of persons 
belonging to minorities is one of the values of the Union referred to in Art. 2 TEU, neither the 
[TEU], nor the [TFEU] provide for a legal base as regards the adoption of legal acts aiming 
at promoting the rights of persons belonging to minorities. Likewise, irrespective of their field 
of action, the Union institutions are bound to respect ‘cultural and linguistic diversity’ (Art. 
3(3) TEU) and to refrain from discrimination based on ‘membership of a national minority’ 
(Art. 21(1) CFR). However, none of these provisions constitutes a legal basis for whatever 
action by the institutions’. The Commission then admitted that some of the acts requested 
through the ECI may fall within the competences of the EU, but it did not specify which ones, 
thus preventing the proponents from promoting a new admissible initiative. The EU Tribunal 
regarded as unlawful the Commission’s failure to state the reasons supporting its conclusion 
and therefore annulled the Commission's decision to refuse registration. The following step 
will be a renewed decision by the Commission, which shall specify whether the specific acts 
requested through the initiative fall within or outside EU competences. Thus, the proponents 
will be able to reformulate a new initiative or to challenge on the merit the decision of the 
Commission. 
 
                                                 
82 See the study on Minority language and education: best practices and pittfalls, European Parliament, 2017. 
83 Case T-646/13, Minority SafePack - one million signatures for diversity in Europe v Commission, 3 February 2017, 
ECLI:EU:T:2017:59. 
84 Commission Decision (2013)5969 of 13 September 2013. 
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The ‘Minority SafePack’ case shows that the EU so far has not adopted any legal act 
specifically aimed to protect national minority, including minority languages. It is 
questionable whether the EU has any competence to adopt legal acts in this field. The follow 
up of the ‘Minority SafePack’ case will provide very useful guidelines. 
 
2.7. Sexual orientation 
 
Sexual orientation is defined as a personal characteristic which is relevant in the choice of a 
person’s partner. This orientation may be either heterosexual (when the choice falls on a 
partner of the opposite sex) or, conversely, homosexual (when the partner chosen is of the 
same sex). It is bisexual when partners of both sexes are chosen. The prohibition of 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation requires that no difference in treatment is 
practiced because of that choice and aims at protecting homosexuals, who are often victims 
of discrimination. 
 
The specific mention of sexual orientation in Art. 19 TFEU is a fundamental step towards the 
recognition of the rights of such persons. The CJEU had indeed previously ruled that the 
reference to sex in Art. 157 TFEU did not include sexual orientation.85 However, as sexual 
orientation is dealt with only by Directive 2000/78/EC, the scope of application of the 
prohibition of discrimination in the EU legal order is ‘only’ employment. In Maruko,86 the CJEU 
held incompatible with the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation German 
legislation whereby partners of a ‘life partnership’ could not benefit from the same pension 
as widows or widowers because same-sex partners cannot marry and, therefore, cannot 
acquire the status of a widow/widower. The CJEU found that the case entailed direct 
discrimination, because the German law life partnership places same-sex couples in a similar 
situation as spouses as regards the enjoyment of social security benefits such as those at 
issue in Maruko.87  
 
Sexual orientation may be particularly relevant with respect to EU acts dealing with family 
status and with freedom of movement of EU citizens. Directive 2004/38/EC does not 
distinguish between same-sex and different-sex spouses and its Art. 3(2) imposes on EU 
Member States a duty to facilitate entry and residence of any family members of an EU 
citizen. This is particularly relevant when family members are TCNs, as they do not enjoy an 
independent right of free movement. Different treatments may also stem from the directive’s 
provision according to which Member States shall facilitate the entry and residence of de 
facto partners of EU citizens only if the partners shared the same household in the country 
from which they have come, or where there exists a ‘durable relationship’ between them, 
which must be ‘duly attested’. By contrast, the obligation is not conditional on the existence 
in the host Member State of a form of registered partnership considered equivalent to 
marriage. If the conditions are satisfied, the host Member State is obliged to ‘facilitate entry 
and residence’ of the partner, taking carefully into account the personal circumstances of the 
person concerned and justifying any denial.  
 
Yet, in Member States which still do not recognise same-sex marriages or registered same-
sex partnerships EU citizens may face obstacles to exercising their freedom of movement 
and staying in another EU country. A specific concern arises regarding children of same-sex 
                                                 
85 See Case C-249/96 Grant, 17 February 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:63, and Case C-13/94 P. v. S., 30 April 1996, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:170.  
86 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko, 1 April 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:179. 
87 The same stance has been followed by CJEU in Case C-147/08, Römer, 1 April 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2011:286.  
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couples, notably when one of the parents is a non-EU citizen and the hosting Member State’s 
laws do not provide for legal recognition of same-sex partners or specific protection for 
children of same-sex couples. 
 
The ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law may still play an important and proactive role in the 
protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation outside the scope of 
application of EU anti-discrimination law and the free movement directive. Despite not being 
expressly mentioned in Art. 14 ECHR, the ECtHR included sexual orientation amongst the 
‘other grounds’ mentioned in that Article.88 Moreover, sexual orientation may find 
autonomous protection also under the concept of ‘family life’ in Article 8 ECHR.89 
 
The European Parliament has already invited the Commission to issue guidelines on the 
proper implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC on the free movement of citizens and their 
family members as well as on Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification of 
TCNs, in order to ‘ensure respect for all forms of families legally recognised under Member 
States’ national laws’. 90 The European Parliament also invited the Commission to ‘make 
proposals for the mutual recognition of the effects of all civil status documents across the 
EU, in order to reduce discriminatory legal and administrative barriers for citizens and their 
families who exercise their right to free movement’. Similarly, the European Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) addressed these issues in the context of a comprehensive 
comparative legal analysis on ‘Protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics in the EU’.91 
 
2.8. Religion or belief 
 
Art. 19 TFEU, Art. 21(1) CFR and Directive 2000/78/EC mention religion amongst the 
prohibited grounds of discrimination. The word religion is associated with the term belief. The 
prohibited ground of discrimination must therefore be interpreted by considering both 
concepts which equally appear in international conventions aimed to recognise freedom of 
religion (notably Art. 9 ECHR and Art. 18 ICCPR). Based on the case law of the ECtHR, which 
must be considered under Article 52(3) CFR, the terms should be interpreted broadly, notably 
as encompassing also the discrimination of churches or, in general, groups around which a 
religious activity is organised.92 These terms must be understood as providing protection in 
relation to any belief, not only those connected in any way to a deity, but also non-religious 
belief systems, i.e. sets of ideas and opinions on life and lifestyle. The concept of non-violence 
and pacifism offers an example because it goes beyond the conceptualisation of peaceful 
                                                 
88 ECtHR, Labassee v. France, No. 65941/11, 26 June 2014, and Mennesson v. France, No. 65192/11, 26 June 2014.  
89 ECtHR, No. 76240/01, Wagner and J.M.W.L v. Luxembourg. 
90 Resolution on the fight against homophobia in Europe, P7_TA(2012) 0222, Brussels, 24 May 2012; Resolution on 
the EU Roadmap against homophobia and discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, 
P7_TA(2014)0062, Brussels, 4 February, 2014. 
91 Protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, gender identity and sex characteristics in the 
EU – Comparative legal analysis – Update 2015, December 2015, available here available here 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2015/lgbti-comparative-legal-update-2015.  
92 ECtHR, No. 7511/76, Campbell and Cosans v. UK, 25 February 1982, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1982:0225JUD000751176; 
No. 14307/88 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1993:0525JUD001430788; No. 23372/94, Larissis 
and others v. Greece, 24 February 1998, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1998:0224JUD002337294; No. 24645/94, Buscarini and 
others v. San Marino, 18 February 1999, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:0218JUD002464594; No. 30814/06, Lautsi v. Italy, 
18 March 2011, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0318JUD003081406; No. 48420/10, Eweida and others v. the United Kingdom, 
15 January 2013, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2013:0115JUD004842010. 
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relations between states and rather involves various aspects of human relations.93 By 
contrast, mere opinions do not fall within the protected scope of the ground concerned. 
 
It is doubtful whether sects may also be granted protection under the rules on freedom of 
religion as well as under the rules concerning discrimination on grounds of religion. Generally 
speaking, the term ‘sect’ refers to a group which, under the mantle of religion, carries out 
activities which are illegal or even harmful to its followers, sometimes violating their dignity. 
In its 1996 resolution on cults in Europe the European Parliament affirmed that freedom of 
religion can be limited when an organisation commits acts of torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or involves serious forms of psychological subjugation, thus urging countries to be 
cautious in granting the status of religious confession to sects whose methods are seriously 
questionable.94 
 
Interesting developments occurred relating to the dialogue with churches, religious 
associations or communities and philosophical and non-confessional organisations required 
under Article 17(3) TFEU.95 Where the EU institutions have a duty to promote and maintain 
the religious dialogue with churches and religious organisations, Article 17(1-2) TFEU refers 
to national law of the Member States for any issues related to the status of churches and 
non-confessional organisations under their jurisdiction. Member States therefore retain 
exclusive competence in the management of religious and philosophical diversity in the 
internal legal order. The EU only has a duty to promote a dialogue and not to prejudice the 
status of churches and religious associations and communities.96 
 
Before the introduction of Art. 19 TFEU the CJEU had the opportunity to consider the religious 
factor as a justification for derogations to the freedom of movement of citizens.97 In an old 
EU staff case the CJEU held that, when organising competitions, the EU institutions shall 
consider religious requirements where duly communicated (for instance in relation to holy 
days), in order to allow all participants to take the tests.98  
 
More interesting are the two cases, decided in 2017 by the CJEU, which dealt with wearing 
religious clothing, notably the headscarf.99 Two employers, one in Belgium and the other one 
in France, had dismissed two Muslim women because they wore a headscarf at work despite 
having been asked to refrain from doing so. When they refused to comply with this request, 
their employment was terminated. The judgments were much awaited, because different 
Advocates General had endorsed different approaches, notably concerning the meaning of 
'direct' and 'indirect' discrimination and the concept of 'genuine and determining occupational 
requirements' provided by Directive 2000/78/EC at Article 4(1). 
 
In Bougnaoui, the CJEU qualified the meaning of ‘religion’ according to Article 10 CFR which 
corresponds to Article 9 ECHR. The Court then qualified both dismissals as different 
                                                 
93 ECtHR, No. 7511/76 Campbell and Cosans v. UK, cit.; No. 25088/94, Chassagnou and others v. France, 29 April 
1999, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1999:0429JUD002508894; No. 7710/02, Grzelak v Poland, 15 June 2010, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2010:0615JUD000771002. 
94 OJ C 78/31 1996. 
95 See the European Ombudsman Decision in his inquiry into complaint 2097/2011/RA against the European 
Commission, interpreting Art. 17 TFEU, available at: 
 https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/49026/html.bookmark  
96 Concerning this, several documents were published under the Seventh Framework Programme of the 
http://www.religareproject.eu/  
97 Case C-41/74, Van Duyn, 4 December 1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:133. 
98 Case C-130/75 Prais, 27 October 1976, ECLI:EU:C:1976:142.  
99 Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui, 14 December 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:204; Case C-157/15, G4S Secure Solutions, 14 
March 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203. While the judgments were issued the same days, the Advocates General's 
opinions were published in different times: Case C-157/15, Achbita, 31 May 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:382; Case C-
188/15, Bougnaoui and ADDH, 13 July 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2016:553. 
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treatments indirectly based on religion or belief according to Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 
2000/78/EC. This led the Court to explore whether such different treatments were objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim by the employer ‘of a policy of neutrality vis-a-vis its customers, 
and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’. As far as the exception 
provided for in Art. 4(1), when a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ occurs, 
the CJEU clearly states that ‘it is not the ground on which the difference of treatment is based 
but a characteristic related to that ground which must constitute a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement […]’. It follows from the information set out above that the concept 
of a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ within the meaning of that provision 
refers to a requirement which is objectively dictated by the nature of the occupational 
activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out. It cannot, however, cover 
subjective considerations, such as the willingness of the employer to take account of the 
particular wishes of the customer. Consequently, the answer to the question put by the 
referring court is that Article 4(1) of Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as meaning that 
the willingness of an employer to take account of the wishes of a customer no longer to have 
the services of that employer provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf cannot be 
considered a genuine and determining occupational requirement within the meaning of that 
provision. 
 
In G4S Secure Solutions the CJEU proposed the same reasoning as regards Bougnaoui, as 
far as the qualification of the difference of treatment as a case of discrimination indirectly 
based on religion is concerned. According to the Court, under Article 2(2)(b)(i) of Directive 
2000/78 such a difference of treatment does not, however, amount to indirect discrimination 
within the meaning of Article 2(2)(b) of the directive if it is objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. The Court then 
states ‘that the desire to display, in relations with both public and private sector customers, 
a policy of political, philosophical or religious neutrality must be considered legitimate and 
stemming from the freedom to conduct a business that is recognised in Article 16 CFR’. The 
Court then clarifies that such a policy of neutrality ‘is, in principle, legitimate, notably where 
the employer involves in its pursuit of that aim only those workers who are required to have 
contacts with the employer’s customers’.100 
 
This interpretation is in line with the ECtHR case law on freedom of religion (Art. 9 ECHR), 
where the Court has stated that a limited restriction on the freedom of religion is admissible 
within the framework of the Convention.101 In the reasoning of the CJEU a key role is played 
by a policy of neutrality already existing in the company before the dismissal and by its 
practical implementation. In order to be admissible the prohibition of wearing visible religious 
clothing must be ‘strictly necessary for the purpose of achieving the aim pursued’. Therefore, 
national judges have to assess if ‘taking into account the inherent constraints to which the 
undertaking is subject, and without G4S being required to take on an additional burden, it 
would have been possible for G4S, faced with such a refusal, to offer her a post not involving 
any visual contact with those customers, instead of dismissing her’. 102 In summary, the Court 
leaves it to national judges to strike a balance between, on one hand the legitimate aim 
pursued by an employer through a policy of neutrality and, on the other the restrictions on 
the freedom of religion which may be limited to what is strictly necessary.  
  
                                                 
100  Case C-157/15, G4S Secure Solutions, cit., para. 38. 
101 ECtHR, of 15 January 2013, Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:2013:0115JUD004842010, 
paragraph 94. 
102 Case C-157/15, G4S Secure Solutions, cit., para. 43. 
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2.9. Age 
 
The specific consideration of age in Art. 13 EC (now Art. 19 TFEU) innovated the legal 
framework at both EU and international level. At the time, only a few Member States had 
legislation against discrimination on grounds of age. While surveys on European population 
demonstrate that the protection of older people is one of the priority issues of social policies, 
only some collective agreements take into account the rights of aged people.  
 
At present, age is one of the grounds of prohibited discrimination targeted by Directive 
2000/78/EC. Moreover, also Art. 21 CFR mentions age. In addition, Arts. 24 and 25 CFR 
contain specific provisions on the protection of the rights of children and the elderly. Similarly, 
Art. 19 TFEU must be interpreted as relating to both the age of the elderly and minors, 
although the discrimination suffered by the elderly population has so far attracted greater 
interest from both the legislator and public opinion. Reference must be made exclusively to 
a chronological criterion and not to a state of mind, as the latter may be related to youth or 
old age regardless of the actual birth date registered. 
 
The vast majority of the CJEU’s judgments concerning age discrimination were based on 
advanced age. There are numerous cases in which pension schemes and/or mandatory 
retirement ages were assessed in light of the prohibition of age discrimination, notably as 
given expression in Directive 2000/78/EC. The Court thus had the opportunity to point out 
that Member States may introduce or maintain differences in treatment based on age in order 
to achieve legitimate objectives of social policy, such as those related to employment policy, 
the labour market or vocational training.103 Among such objectives are the need to establish 
‘an age structure that balances young and older civil servants in order to encourage the 
recruitment and promotion of young people, to improve personnel management and thereby 
to prevent possible disputes concerning employees' fitness to work beyond a certain age, 
while at the same time seeking to provide a high-quality justice service, [which] can 
constitute a legitimate aim of employment and labour market policy’.104 However, in order 
not to entail age discrimination the legitimate aim pursued must be appropriate and 
necessary. National provisions do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the purpose 
and do not cause excessive injury to the interests of the people to whom those provisions 
refer, taking into account both the damage they can cause to the people involved and the 
benefits that derive to society as a whole and the individuals who make up this society.105 
 
The CJEU also had the chance to state that the maximum age limit for access to or the 
termination of a profession does not amount to discrimination when it constitutes an essential 
and genuine requirement of the work. The reasonableness of the limit provided for shall be 
decided case by case.106 
Outside the scope of application of Directive 2000/78/EC, EU and national provisions (within 
the meaning of Art. 51(1) CFR) entailing discrimination on the grounds of age may be 
challenged through Art. 21(1) CFR. So far, all CJEU cases on age discrimination concerned 
                                                 
103 Case C-388/07, Age Concern England, 5 March 2009, ECLI:EU:C:2009:128, para. 46; Case C-447/09, Prigge, 
12 September 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:573, para. 81; Case C-530/13, Schmitzer, 11 November 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2359. 
104 Case C-159/10, Fuchs e Köhler, 21 July 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:508, para. 50. 
105 Case C-45/09, Rosenbladt, 12 October 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:601, para. 73; Case C-286/12, Commission v. 
Hungary, 6 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687; Case C-297/10, Hennings 8 September 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:560; Case C-530/13, Schmitzer, 11 November 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2359; Case C-417/13, 
Starjakob, 28 January 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:38; Case C-515/13, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark, 26 February 2015, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:115. 
106 Case C-229/08, Wolf, 12 January 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:3; Case C-416/13, Vital Pérez, 13 November 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2371; Case Prigge, cit., paras. 65-76; Case C-341/08, Petersen, 12 January 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:4, paras. 44-64. 
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subject-matter covered by Directive 2000/78/EC. However, the Charter played an important 
role in some of them, because the Court affirmed that the prohibition of age discrimination 
in Art. 21(1) CFR has direct horizontal effect (which the directives’ provisions do not have).107  
 
2.10. Disability 
 
The term ‘handicap’ appeared in the original version of Art. 13 TCE, but was later replaced 
with the more politically correct term ‘disability’, which is currently employed in Art. 19. The 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), adopted on 13 December 
2006, to which the Union is a party, is a relevant legal source in this context.108 As an 
international treaty binding upon the EU it has acquired a legal status subordinate to the EU 
Treaties, but overarching secondary laws. This means that EU legal acts, particularly the anti-
discrimination directives, shall respect the UNCRPD and shall be interpreted in line with that 
Convention. 
 
Lacking an explicit definition in EU law, the interpretation of the notion of disability was given 
by the CJEU in preliminary rulings mainly referred to it by Danish courts. Thus, according to 
the CJEU the concept of disability excludes in principle mere disease, unless it constitutes, 
during a certain period of time, an obstacle to participation in professional life.109 In HK 
Denmark Ring and Werge the Court also stated that the state of obesity of an employee, 
resulting in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments, may in interaction 
with various barriers hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in 
professional life on an equal basis with other workers. If this limitation is of long duration 
such a disease may fall within the definition of ‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 
2000/78/EC.110  
 
The CJEU has therefore adhered to a social model of disability, as opposed to the outdated 
medical model. The political institutions then started to employ the interpretation given by 
the CJEU.111 Later the Court stressed that ‘the EU concept of disability was explicitly aligned 
with that of the UN Convention’.112 
 
Clearly, the Court held that the concept of disability must be understood as ‘a limitation which 
results in particular from physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction 
with various barriers may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned 
in professional life on an equal basis with other workers’.113 Discrimination may also occur 
when a person is not himself/herself disabled but suffers discriminatory behaviour due to 
their child’s disability.114 
Finally, in the preliminary reference in Glatzel,115 which challenged the compatibility of certain 
EU provisions on driving licenses with the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
disability, the Court applied Article 21 CFR relying on the same notion of ‘disability’ it has 
embraced in the context of Directive 2000/78/EC.   
                                                 
107 On this issue and the relevant CJEU’s case law see point 1.2.2. above and Annex II. 
108 The Convention (see text here: http://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/convention/convoptprot-e.pdf 
entered into force on 3 May 2008. The European Union is part since 23 December 2010. 
109 Case Chacón Navas, cit.. 
110 Case Fag og Arbejde (FOA), cit. 
111 A definition of disability may however be found in the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed 
Commitment to a Barrier-Free Europe, COM(2010)636 final; S. Favalli, D. Ferri, Defining Disability in the EU Non-
Discrimination Legislation: Judicial Activism and Legislative Restraints, European Public Law, 2016, 22(3), 3. 
112 Case C-363/12, Z., 18 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:159; S. Favalli, D. Ferri, cit., p. 15. 
113 Case C-335/11, HK Denmanrk Ring and Werge, 11 April 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:222. 
114 Case Coleman, cit. 
115 Case Glatzel, cit., paras. 44-46. 
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3. ISSUES ARISING FROM THE ANALYSIS OF PETITIONS 
 
KEY ISSUES 
 The following topics have emerged as more problematic: competence/scope of 
application; national minorities and language; free movement of EU citizens and 
recognition of LGBT families; child alternative care; age. 
 Assessment of a claim of discrimination in individual cases requires a detailed 
analysis on merits and laws. 
 
3.1. Competence – scope of application 
 
One horizontal issue stemming from the petitions analysed is that of the scope of application 
of EU anti-discrimination law, including the Charter. This leads to a more general question 
regarding the extension of the EU’s competence and hence the limits of the EU institutions’ 
activity, notably when an act of a Member State is challenged. As explained in the first part 
of this analysis, a connection with an EU competence is necessary to trigger the application 
of the Charter, including the rights to equality and non-discrimination. This is a recurrent 
issue when citizens challenge EU law and it is addressed abundantly by reports, academics 
and CJEU case law, but it is still crucial even in the petitions analysed in this study. 
 
The findings of the European Parliament and the European Commission concerning EU 
competence and the scope of application of EU law often diverge. While the Parliament 
appears to have given an overbroad interpretation of the limits of EU competence, the 
Commission seems to have followed an excessively narrow approach. The reasons for these 
two different approaches lie in the existence of ‘grey zones’, where in principle EU law may 
apply if a connection with EU law is shown, e.g. family statutes in cases of free movement of 
EU citizens and their family members, including third country nationals. In other cases, there 
is no EU legal act in force but there is prima facie a relevant reference in the Treaties, e.g. 
the values of the European Union or certain grounds of discrimination mentioned in Art. 21 
CFR, and EU citizens are understandably tempted to invoke EU law, primary law and the 
Charter. We cannot assume that EU citizens are sophisticated lawyers who understand the 
exact scope and effects of those provisions, especially in disputes of competence which cause 
different views and approaches even among academics, EU institutions and the judiciary.  
 
The EP thus often faces a choice between the devil and the deep blue sea: giving a precise 
although apparently strict interpretation of the scope of EU law and declaring the petition 
inadmissible, thereby frustrating the petitioner's request, or giving a wider interpretation, 
with the real risk of confronting its position to the different and often opposite position 
assumed by the European Commission. A compromise should be followed: on the one hand 
adhering to a stricter interpretation of the scope of EU law, in line with the stance of the 
CJEU, and on the other hand showing petitioners alternative means of redress, more suitable 
to the described facts. This is already present in many of the replies to the petitions 
examined, but in some cases an alternative answer could be suggested. Indeed, EU citizens 
should be made well aware that a ‘negative’ reply to their petitions does not mean that the 
EU is unwilling to act. In fact, it is often the case that the EU is unable to act because the 
Member States decided to retain exclusive competence in several areas. 
 
Discrimination(s) as emerging from petitions received 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 37 
 3.2. National minorities and language 
 
Several petitions deal with discrimination of national minorities on the grounds of language. 
Despite the differences in the countries concerned and the specific facts of the cases, 
petitions 0609/2013, 0111/2016, 0141/2016 and 0217/2014 raise similar issues (for 
the details see Annex V). If, on the one hand, both the European Union and the Member 
States have the duty to respect national minorities, only the Member States are also required 
to promote their effective equality of treatment in accordance with international instruments, 
such as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.116  
 
However, as explained in the ‘National minorities’ section, while the EU competence to adopt 
a legal act on such a matter is questionable – and the ‘Minority SafePack’ case is very useful 
to shed light on this issue – the European Union has not adopted any relevant legal act on 
this matter so far. Thus, while minority language teaching or the use of names in minority 
languages in public signs are two key issues when dealing with minority rights, they fall, in 
principle, outside EU law competence.117 This means that neither anti-discrimination 
directives nor the Charter are applicable per se here, unless a case of discrimination on the 
grounds of race/ethnic origin or religion/belief occurs within the scope of application of the 
two '2000 directives. 
 
This is a paradigmatic example of a right stated in the Charter but not covered by an EU 
competence or at least an EU legal measure. This means that, despite the references to 
respecting the rights of minorities (Art. 2 TEU - Art. 21 CFR) and linguistic diversity (Art. 3(3) 
TEU, 165 and 198 TFEU and 22 CFR), the Member States did not entrust the Union with a 
general competence to enact legislation aimed at protecting and promoting linguistic or other 
minorities. The Union, rather, has a negative duty ‘to respect’ and not ‘to adopt measures’ 
containing provisions that would violate the overarching provisions. 
 
Petition 1123/2013 is only partially different. It concerns the use of a sign language in 
Austria by persons who are deaf. Although Austrian sign language is constitutionally 
recognised as an official language, deaf Austrian citizens cannot use it as a first language 
and are obliged to learn spoken German at school. The language grounds could be invoked 
in relation to the rights of linguistic minorities. However, from a strictly legal point of view, 
people who are deaf are not recognised as a ‘national minority’, at least not yet. In any case, 
there is no explicit protection in EU law, unless an unfavourable treatment amounts to 
discrimination on one of the protected grounds under Article 19 TFEU and the '2000 
directives. Indeed, the petitioner invokes an obligation stemming from the Austrian 
constitution and not from EU law. A different conclusion can be drawn from the accession of 
the Union to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. As 
already explained, the UNCRPD applies within EU competences and may not enable the EU 
institutions to adopt new legal measures not allowed by the EU Treaties. However, EU 
secondary laws must respect and be interpreted in line with the UN Convention (see above 
at paragraph 2.10).  
 
                                                 
116 Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Thematic 
commentary No. 3, The language rights of persons belonging to national minorities under the Framework 
Convention, 24 May 2012. 
117 See the study on Minority language and education: best practices and pittfalls, cit. 
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3.3. Free movement of EU citizens 
3.3.1. Obstacles to the free movement of LGBT families 
 
Petition 0320/2016 and petition 0513/2016, which is still pending at the time of writing 
this analysis, concern the problems for LGBT families stemming from the lack of EU-wide 
recognition of civil statuses regularly constituted in a Member State. 
 
In petition 0320/2016, a French national complained of different instances of 
discrimination by the French consulates in London and Cape Town he allegedly experienced 
because of his registered partnership with a same-sex South African citizen. At the time when 
the petition was filed the couple was living in La Reunion on a multi-entry 3-year Schengen 
visa. They had previously lived in the UK, but – according to the petitioner – they had to 
leave because he had no permanent job and, therefore, his partner could not obtain a 
residence card. Discrimination allegedly took place during the official registering of their 
partnership when the South African partner applied for a Schengen visa and when they asked 
information regarding French citizenship. The petitioner also asked the European Parliament 
to help his partner obtain French citizenship prior to the mandatory 5 years of marriage for 
couples outside of France. The PETI Committee decided not to ask the Commission’s view 
and advised the petitioner to raise the matter with the French Ombudsman or, alternatively, 
to seek redress before the ECtHR, after exhaustion of available remedies at national level.  
 
In our opinion some instances of discrimination described in the petition are (potentially) 
connected to EU law, although additional information is needed to provide a more precise 
answer. Firstly, there is a clear link to EU law with respect to the difficulties encountered by 
the South African partner when applying for the Schengen visa. When applying the Visa 
Code118 Member States implement EU law within the meaning of Art. 51(1) CFR. Therefore, 
they must respect Art. 21(1) CFR which prohibits discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation (Art. 21(1) CFR). The petition does contain enough information to establish 
whether this prohibition was infringed by the French authorities, but in case it was, redress 
could be sought (before a national judge) based on the Charter.119  
 
Secondly, to the understanding of the petitioner, in order to live and work together in Europe 
his partner needs to acquire French citizenship. Yet, based on EU law (notably Directive 
2004/38/EC) family members of an EU citizen, including those who are not EU citizens 
themselves, may enjoy a derivative right to accompany or join the EU citizen in a host 
Member State, as well as a derivative right to reside there for a longer period than three 
months, provided – in the latter case – that the two have ‘sufficient resources’ so as not to 
become a burden for the host state and a comprehensive sickness insurance.120 When these 
requirements are satisfied, the host Member State is under a duty to allow entry and 
residence of the partner who is in a registered partnership with the EU citizen, provided that 
the host Member State recognises registered partnerships as equivalent to marriage.121 In 
                                                 
118 Regulation (EC) No. 810/2009 of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009, establishing a 
Community Code on Visas, OJ L 243, 15.9.2009, p. 1–58. 
119 See, by analogy, Case C-23/12, Zakaria, 17 January 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:24. 
120 See Art. 7(1) and (2) of Directive 2004/38/EC. In fact, according to the case law of the CJEU, it is not necessary 
that the EU citizen provides the sufficient resources, they may also come from the TCN: see Case C-200/02, Chen, 
19 October 2004, ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, para. 47. 
121 See. Artt. 2(2) and 3(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC, which apply equally to EU citizens and family members who 
are TCNs. Indeed, these two provisions, interpreted in light of the CJEU’s case law (Reed, cit.), apply also to same-
sex couples. A broader discussion is provided above (Part II, section on “Sexual orientation” ground), as well as 
below (analysis of petition 0513/2016).  
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addition, if the non-EU family member needs to hold an entry visa122 Art. 5(2) of the directive 
provides that ‘Member States shall grant such persons every facility to obtain the necessary 
visas [; s]uch visas shall be issued free of charge as soon as possible and on the basis of an 
accelerated procedure’. 
 
By contrast, Directive 2004/38 cannot establish a derived right of residence for third country 
nationals who are family members of a Union citizen in the Member State of which that citizen 
is a national.123 However, depending on the circumstances of the case a similar outcome may 
sometimes be reached through the CJEU’s case law on the so-called ‘returners’, i.e. EU 
citizens or workers who return to their Member State of origin after having exercised the EU 
right to free movement or to work in another Member State. According to the CJEU ‘Article 
21(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that, where a Union citizen has created or 
strengthened a family life with a third country national during genuine residence, pursuant 
to and in conformity with the conditions set out in Article 7(1) and (2) and Article 16(1) and 
(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC in a Member State other than that of which s/he is a national, 
the provisions of that directive apply by analogy where that Union citizen returns, with the 
family member in question, to his Member State of origin. Therefore, the conditions for 
granting a derived right of residence to a third country national who is a family member of 
that Union citizen, in the latter’s Member State of origin, should not, in principle, be more 
strict than those provided for by that directive for the grant of a derived right of residence to 
a third country national who is a family member of a Union citizen who has exercised his 
right of freedom of movement by becoming established in a Member State other than the 
Member State of which he is a national’.124 
 
Based on the information provided it is difficult to establish whether the petitioner and his 
partner could take advantage of this case law. Before leaving the EU the couple spent some 
time in the UK, but there are not enough elements to establish whether their stay could be 
qualified as ‘genuine residence’. Apparently, the partner of the petitioner did not enjoy, in 
the UK, a (derived) right to reside based on Directive 2004/38/EC. However, the petitioner’s 
statement that, since he had no permanent job, his partner could not obtain a residence card 
and therefore they had to leave, may raise some doubts concerning the correct application 
of that directive by the UK authorities. The requirement of having ‘sufficient resources’ for 
the family member, prescribed by Art. 7(1) and (2) of the directive, should not necessarily 
imply that the EU citizen has a permanent job. 
 
Clarification on the relevance of EU law in cases such as this one may be provided by the 
CJEU’s decision on pending case C-673/16 Coman. The Romanian Constitutional Court asked 
for an interpretation of Directive 2004/38/EC in relation to the case of two men (one of 
Romanian nationality and the other of US nationality) who, after having married in Belgium 
in 2010, moved to the US and after that filed a directive-based request to obtain a residence 
permit in Romania.  
 
This request was rejected because Art. 277§2 of the Romanian Civil Code bans the 
recognition in Romania of same-sex marriages performed abroad. Based on unofficial 
information,125 the Romanian Constitutional Court ‘essentially asked whether a same-sex 
                                                 
122 Notably, in the case of nationals of a Member State for which an entry visa is required by Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 (for instance, South Africa). 
123 Case C-456/12, O., 12 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:135. 
124 Ibid., operative part. 
125 At the time of writing, the information on the case is not yet available in the Curia website. 
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non-EU citizen spouse of an EU citizen qualifies as a ‘spouse’ in the sense of Directive 
2004/38/EC or, in the subsidiary, as ‘any other family member’ or as a ‘partner’ in a ‘durable 
relationship’ under the same directive, for the purposes of the right to reside in the latter’s 
home EU Member State’.126 Considering the above, the petitioner should have been advised 
to seek legal assistance aimed at disentangling the EU law aspects of his case, possibly in 
order to raise some of the alleged instances of violation before a national court.  
 
In petition 0513/2016 the petitioner is a Greek woman, married in the UK to a British 
woman, who gave birth to a daughter in Spain. Whilst both women are registered as parents 
in the Spanish birth certificate, only the (Greek) biological mother is recognised in the UK. 
According to the petitioner’s statements her British spouse should adopt the child in order to 
get recognition of parenthood in the UK. By contrast, there would be no provision for similar 
families under Greek law. The petitioner complains that her daughter has no passport and, 
therefore, the family is unable to travel.  
 
It is our opinion that the case presents (at least potentially) several connections with the 
scope of application with EU law. Preliminarily, however, we think that the petitioner’s 
statement that the child cannot get a passport must be qualified. Apparently, the child should 
be entitled to a Greek passport, because the biological mother is Greek and, to our 
knowledge, ius sanguinis applies in such a situation. If the couple is experiencing problems 
in obtaining the Greek passport, a violation (by Greek authorities) of Article 4(3) of Directive 
2004/38/EC may be at issue. According to this provision ‘Member States shall, acting in 
accordance with their laws, issue to their own nationals, and renew, an identity card or 
passport stating their nationality’. As regards the impossibility to get a British passport 
(lacking adoption of the child by the petitioner’s spouse), it must be recalled that the rules 
on civil status fall – in principle –127 within the competences of the Member States. However, 
once the child obtains the Greek passport the family may rely on Art. 21 TFEU and on 
Directive 2004/38/EC, which specifies the rights stemming directly from the Treaty, taking 
into account, to some extent, the situation of same-sex couples or partners.  
 
If one of the two women does not meet the conditions to reside in another Member State for 
more than 3 months she may enjoy a derivative right of residence as a family member of a 
EU citizen, provided that the spouse is able to satisfy the residence conditions128 for them 
both (and for the daughter). As for the daughter, it does not matter whether the ‘sufficient 
resources’ required by the Directive are provided for her by the biological mother or her 
spouse. According to the CJEU’s case law, EU law does not make provision on the source of 
those resources.129  
 
It is true that in case of LGBT families Directive 2004/38/EC does not always ensure the 
possibility of preserving family unity throughout the EU (even when there is no problem from 
the point of view of the ‘sufficient resources’ requirement. This is a corollary of the notion of 
‘family member’ embraced by Article 2(2) of the Directive, which grants – in principle – a 
                                                 
126 C. Cojocariu, “Same-sex marriage before the courts and before the people: the story of a tumultuous year for 
LGBT rights in Romania”, 25 January 2017, available here http://verfassungsblog.de/same-sex-marriage-before-
the-courts-and-before-the-people-the-story-of-a-tumultuous-year-for-lgbt-rights-in-romania/. 
127Under Art. 81 TFEU, the EU may adopt measures on family law which have cross-border implications (such as the 
recognition of civil status established in other Member States), but so far the Member States have not reached an 
agreement on this. However, as explained below, cross-border cases on civil status may fall within the scope of EU 
law.  
128 See art. 7 of Directive 2004/38/EC, which is inspired to the idea that EU citizens and their family members shall 
not become a(n economic) burden for the host Member State. 
129 See Chen, cit., para. 30 
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proper derivative right of entry and residence to the following family members of the EU 
citizen exercising the primary right of movement: ‘(a) the spouse; (b) the partner with whom 
the Union citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a 
Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships as 
equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in the relevant 
legislation of the host Member State; (c) the direct descendants who are under the age of 21 
or are dependants and those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b)’. When none of 
these categories is relevant, then Article 3(2), entitled ‘Beneficiaries’, may be. However, it 
only makes provision for a duty of the host Member State to facilitate entry and residence of 
the persons concerned, not for an obligation thereof.130 Notably, facilitation concerns the 
partner with whom the Union citizen has a durable relationship, duly attested.131 
 
It can also be noted that in cases of LGBT couples who are married the interpretation of the 
‘family members’ notion raises some doubts, concerning notably whether their situation falls 
under Art. 2(2) (a), Art. 2(b), or under Art. 3(2)(b) of the directive. The CJEU has not yet 
clarified this point. If the situation fell under Art. 2(2) (a), the implicit assumption would be 
that a Member State shall recognise – though only for the purposes of Directive 2004/38/EC 
– a civil status established in another Member State, even though the host state does not 
make provision for it. The diametrically opposite interpretation is that the weaker situation 
applies (i.e. that of Art. 3(2)), because Art. 2(2)(b) refers only to registered partnerships, 
not to marriage. Yet, this would result into a worse condition for same-sex married couples 
than for same-sex registered partners (which appears to be in contrast with the rationale of 
the provisions concerned). At least the same status as registered partners should be granted 
to spouses. As stated clarification should come from case C-673/16 Coman.132 
 
Clearly, in a case such as that in the petition, the non-biological parent may encounter 
obstacles in exercising her free movement rights together with the daughter, but 
independently from her spouse. However, the fact that the rules on civil status are within the 
Member States’ competence does not mean that situations concerning the (lack of EU-wide) 
recognition of civil status necessarily fall outside the scope of EU law. Indeed, similar 
situations may fall within the scope of EU law.  
 
The CJEU has not yet ruled on a case about obstacles to free movement stemming from 
heterogeneous national provisions on civil statuses. Its reasoning in the case law on the 
recognition in a Member State of a surname registered in another Member State, where 
different rules apply (Garcia Avello, Grunkin and Paul and Sayn-Wittgenstein cases)133, is 
therefore worthy of some attention.  
 
According to the CJEU the rules on surname fall within the Member States’ competence but 
they are nonetheless relevant under EU law when they are likely to hamper the exercise of 
the free movement rights conferred on EU citizens by Article 21 TFEU. The national legislation 
                                                 
130 The duty of facilitation implies that ‘[the] host Member State shall undertake an extensive examination of the 
personal circumstances and shall justify any denial of entry or residence to these people’ (see Art. 3(2) of the 
Directive, last sentence). 
131 Apparently, Directive 2004/38/EC realised an imperfect codification of the CJEU’s case law: based on the Court’s 
judgment in Case C-59/85, Reed, 17 April 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:157, paras. 28-29, there should be a duty to allow 
entry and residence of the partner – rather than a mere duty to facilitate entry and residence – if the host Member 
State grants the right to entry and reside to the unmarried partners of its nationals.  
132 See the analysis of the previous petition. 
133 See, respectively, Case C-148/02, Garcia Avello, 2 October 2003, ECLI:EU:C:2003:539, Case C-353/06, Grunkin 
and Paul, 14 October 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:559, and Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein, 22 December 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:806. 
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responsible for the obstacle to free movement could be justified, notably on public policy 
grounds, but – as is well-known – this limit is interpreted strictly by the CJEU.  
 
Justifications based on public policy seem particularly pertinent in civil status cases. 
Interestingly, however, in its surname case law, the Court put special emphasis on the fact 
that the surname is a constituent component of a person's identity. A similar reasoning may 
be extended to cases where obstacles to free movement stem from diverging national 
provisions on parenthood, notably in the light of the recent case law at the ECtHR, whereby, 
in order to pursue the best interests of the child, his or her identity must be protected, and 
affiliation is a fundamental aspect thereof.134 
 
In conclusion, we think that in light of the complex legal background and the many potential 
connections to EU law, it is important to ensure that petitioners who present cases similar to 
the two examined in this section receive as much complete and facts-specific information as 
possible.  
Whilst the Your Europe Portal (http://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/index_en.htm) may be 
a starting point, qualified legal assistance will be often essential.  
 
3.3.2. National citizenship law potentially entailing loss of EU citizenship  
 
In petition 1315/2015 the former President of the Hungarian Supreme Court complained 
about the amendment to the Slovak citizenship law enacted in 2010, which provides for the 
automatic loss of Slovak citizenship when one acquires another citizenship. According to the 
petitioner, the law is in contrast with both the Slovak Constitution and with the ‘fundamental 
principles of European integration’.  
 
Whilst constitutionality control is outside the EU mandate, the CJEU’s Rottmann judgment135   
suggests that national legislation providing for the automatic loss of citizenship becomes 
relevant under EU law (though not necessary incompatible with it) when it entails the loss of 
(also) EU citizenship. This occurs in a case such as that at issue when a Slovak citizen acquires 
the nationality of a non-EU Member State. By contrast, there is no link with EU law when the 
citizen acquires the nationality of another EU Member State, as s/he will keep EU citizenship, 
despite the loss of Slovak nationality.136  
 
The CJEU has repeatedly stated that ‘it is for each Member State, having due regard to 
[Union] law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of nationality’.137 In 
Rottmann, as the Commission recalled in its view on the petition, the CJEU clarified that ‘the 
                                                 
134 ECtHR, Labassee v. France, No. 65941/11, 26 June 2014, and Mennesson v. France, No. 65192/11, 26 June 
2014. See also ECtHR, No. 76240/01, Wagner and J.M.W.L v. Luxembourg. 
135 Case C-34/09, Rottmann, 2 March 2010, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104. The case concerned an individual case of 
withdrawal, because of deception, of the German nationality acquired through naturalisation by an Austrian citizen. 
Since Austrian law on citizenship does not allow double nationality, the man had lost his Austrian nationality. Thus, 
withdrawal of the German nationality would have render him stateless, thus losing EU citizenship as well. 
136 Indeed, the historical background of the petition suggests that this is the main scenario caused by the Slovak 
Law on Citizenship of 2010, which was adopted following to an amendment to the Hungarian Citizenship Act that 
has broadened the conditions to apply for naturalisation. The Slovak amendment therefore concerns, primarily, 
Slovak citizen who decide(d) to acquire Hungarian citizenship. For some insights, see M. Ganczer, “Hungary – the 
twisted story of dual citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe”, 8 October 2014, available here 
http://verfassungsblog.de/hungarians-outside-hungary-twisted-story-dual-citizenship-central-eastern-europe/. 
137 Case C‑369/90, Micheletti and Others, 7 July 1992, ECLI:EU:C:1992:295, para. 10; Case C‑179/98, Mesbah, 11 
November 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:549, para. 29; Case C‑200/02, Zhu and Chen, 19 October 2004, ECLI 
ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, para. 37. 
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proviso that due regard must be had to Union law (...) enshrines the principle that, in respect 
of citizens of the Union, the exercise of that power, in so far as it affects the rights conferred 
and protected by the legal order of the Union, as is in particular the case of a decision 
withdrawing naturalisation (…), is amenable to judicial review carried out in the light of 
European Union law.’138 
 
Thus, whilst the CJEU has not ruled out the possibility of losing EU citizenship, it has rejected 
the possibility that the loss of EU citizenship be the automatic consequence of the loss of 
nationality of a Member State. Indeed, it requires that the proportionality of the decision of 
withdrawal of national citizenship is examined by taking into account ‘the consequences [it] 
entails for the situation of the person concerned in the light of EU law’.139 In particular, regard 
must be had ‘to the importance which primary law attaches to the status of citizen of the 
Union, when examining a decision withdrawing naturalisation it is necessary, therefore, to 
take into account the consequences that the decision entails for the person concerned and, 
if relevant, for the members of his family with regard to the loss of the rights enjoyed by 
every citizen of the Union. In this respect, it is necessary to establish, in particular, whether 
that loss is justified in relation to the gravity of the offence committed by that person, to the 
lapse of time between the naturalisation decision and the withdrawal decision and to whether 
it is possible for that person to recover his original nationality’.140 
 
The principles affirmed by the CJEU in Rottmann (notably the preclusion of any automatism) 
should apply also in individual cases where the loss of EU citizenship is the consequence of 
the application of a citizenship law such as the one adopted in Slovakia in 2010. The CJEU’s 
judgment in Kaur,141 concerning the nationality of British overseas citizens, seems to support 
this conclusion. The CJEU affirmed that the 1972 Declaration through which the UK defined 
the category of citizens to be considered as its nationals for the purposes of the application 
of (then) Community law was not in contrast with that law ‘[because] it did not have the 
effect of depriving any person who did not satisfy [that] definition (...) of rights to which that 
person might be entitled under Community law. The consequence was rather that such rights 
never arose in the first place for such a person’.142 Reasoning a contrario, national legislation 
on citizenship which may entail deprivation of EU citizenship, may not be totally compatible 
with EU law. In such a situation the person concerned could seek redress before a national 
court which, in case of doubts, may refer a question for preliminary ruling to the CJEU. 
 
3.3.3  Free movement rights of non-EU family members of EU citizens 
 
In petition 1164/2013 an Estonian national living in the UK stated that her mother was 
not able to visit her because the UK decided to no longer recognise the Aliens Passport, i.e. 
the passport granted to people – such as her mother – belonging to the Russian speaking 
minority in Estonia, who are not considered Estonian citizens. In its reply the Commission 
pointed out that the Union has no general competence as regards the protection of minorities 
and that, since they do not hold a Member State's nationality, Estonian non-citizens cannot 
rely on EU citizenship rights. The Commission also affirmed that there were insufficient 
elements to establish whether the UK authorities’ refusal to deal with the visa application of 
the petitioner’s mother complied with EU law. 
                                                 
138 Rottmann, cit., para. 48. 
139 Ibid., para. 55. 
140 Ibid., para. 56. 
141 Kaur, cit. 
142 Ibid., para. 25. 
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We agree with the first part of the Commission’s answer. Indeed, concerning the citizenship 
issue, the CJEU’s judgment in Kaur, which we mentioned in the analysis of petition 
1315/2015, seems relevant. As for the second part of the Commission’s answer, the 
privileged status of the family members of an EU citizen maybe deserved some additional 
attention. Apparently, the petitioner’s daughter falls within the scope of Directive 
2004/38/EC, as she is living in a host Member State. Indeed, the directive grants to the 
‘dependent direct relatives in the ascending line’ 143 of a EU citizen the right to accompany 
or join him/her in a host Member State, subject to the conditions and limits prescribed by 
the directive itself. A family member who is a not an EU citizen shall hold ‘an entry visa 
obtained in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 or, where appropriate, with 
national law’. The directive expressly points out that ‘Member States shall grant such persons 
every facility to obtain the necessary visas. Such visas shall be issued free of charge as soon 
as possible and on the basis of an accelerated procedure’.  
 
It is also worth noting that, as concerns stateless persons, recital 7 of Regulation 539/2001 
points out that ‘the decision as to the visa requirement or exemption should be based on the 
third country in which these persons reside and which issued their travel documents’. 
‘However, given the differences in the national legislation applicable to stateless persons (...), 
Member States may decide whether these categories of persons shall be subject to the visa 
requirement, where the third country in which these persons reside and which issued their 
travel documents is a third country whose nationals are exempt from the visa requirement.’ 
If a person in a situation such as that of the petitioner’s mother is to be regarded as stateless, 
then it could be argued that, since she resides in a Member State, she could be exempted 
from the visa requirement. By contrast, if she is regarded as a TCN, then, according to Art. 
10 of Directive 2004/38/EC ‘possession of the valid residence card referred to in Article 10 
shall exempt such family members from the visa requirement.’ 
 
In sum, in cases such as that in the petition EU law provisions on (derived) free movement 
rights of the family members of EU citizens, notably those of Directive 2004/38/EC, may be 
relevant. It would therefore be worthwhile recommending the petitioner to ask legal 
assistance to disentangle the EU law aspects of his/her case. Moreover, the petitioner could 
also be referred to Your Europe Portal for general information. 
 
3.4.  Alternative care for children 
 
In petitions 1852/2013, 1655/2013, 1847/2013, 2498/2013, 2543/2013 and 
2546/2013 the petitioners complain about violations by the UK social services in the context 
of children's removal from parental custody. In all petitions but one (2543/2013) the 
petitioners are EU citizens, but they are not UK nationals. In four petitions, instances of 
discrimination on grounds of language and/or religion and/or ethnicity are alleged. In two 
petitions (2498/2013 and 2543/2013) no instance of discrimination is alleged and based on 
the information received it is difficult to identify any. However, in petition 2543/2013 the 
petitioner complains about a travel ban. All petitions were declared admissible by the PETI 
Committee. By contrast, the Commission found them to be outside the scope of EU law and 
expressed the concern that a hearing could raise false expectations.  
 
                                                 
143 Cf. Art. 2(2)(d) of Directive 2004/38/EC. 
Discrimination(s) as emerging from petitions received 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 45 
We decided to devote some special attention to this set of petitions because, as remarked by 
the Commission, their number is increasing. Petitions on children's rights in general can be 
expected to increase because the Lisbon Treaty introduced many new references to the 
objective of protecting this vulnerable group. Yet, in many (probably most) respects the 
Member States retain their competence, as is the case with the substantive rules on  removal 
of a child from parental care. The relevance of EU law then depends on the specific 
circumstances of each case. For instance, in cross-border cases on alternative care Regulation 
(EC) No 2201/2003 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility may come into play. The CJEU 
has indeed interpreted its scope as covering ‘a decision ordering that a child be immediately 
taken into care and placed outside his original home (...), where that decision was adopted 
in the context of public law rules relating to child protection’. 
 
In principle, the right of EU citizens to freely move within the EU may also apply to similar 
cases within the scope of EU law, because a decision to place a minor EU-citizen into 
alternative care constitutes a limitation of his/her right to free movement (and possibly of 
the same rights of his/her parents). However, that decision is likely to be justified on public 
policy grounds, being inspired - as a rule - by the best interests of the child. Similar 
considerations apply to the travel ban complained about in petition 2543/2013. 
 
Since four out of six petitioners alleged instances of discrimination, attention shall be paid to 
anti-discrimination legislation. Yet, national rules on child removal fall outside the scope of 
Directive 2000/78/EC, which concerns only employment and occupation. As for Directive 
2000/43/EC (the Racial Equality Directive), which has a broader scope, the question is 
whether the activity of national social services relating to the care of children removed from 
their families constitutes a measure of ‘social protection’ for the purpose of Art. 3(1)(e) of 
Directive 2004/43. The Commission answered the question negatively, arguing that this 
notion ‘should not be understood as covering the functioning of child welfare services, but 
rather as covering measures in the field of social security and healthcare’.  
 
It is respectfully submitted that this interpretation appears to be too restrictive. The 
expression used in Art. 3(1)(e) of the Directive (‘including social security and healthcare’) 
rather suggests that ‘social protection’ has a broader coverage than the two fields expressly 
mentioned. We would therefore encourage a discussion on this notion's coverage, which, 
incidentally, shall be the same throughout the EU. Unlike other EU law instruments where 
the same notion appears Art. 3(1)(e) does not refer to the national law of the Member States. 
The notion of ‘social protection’ should therefore receive an autonomous EU law 
interpretation, which the CJEU is ultimately competent to provide.   
 
Directive 2004/38 may also provide a connection with EU law. Its Art. 24 states that ‘all 
Union citizens residing based on this directive in the territory of the host Member State shall 
enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State within the scope of the Treaty’. 
If children who are nationals of the Member State concerned are allowed to learn their 
language (when different from that of the State of nationality) or to practice their religion, 
children of other Member States should receive the same treatment (provided that they enjoy 
a right to reside in the host Member State under Directive 2004/38). 
 
In sum, although it is not possible to affirm that EU law was undoubtedly applicable in some 
of the cases at issue, and even less that it was violated, this group of petitions well illustrates 
how complex, relative and dynamic the scope of EU law is. To avoid that petitioners are faced 
with a negative answer regarding the many references to children protection in the Treaties 
as nothing really serious, an effort should be made to explain what the EU did, can do and 
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cannot do in the field. It is also important to convey the message that another source of law 
(national law or the ECHR) will be applicable when EU law is not.  
 
3.5.  Age 
 
Petition 0309/2015 deals with a case of discrimination on the grounds of age. The 
petitioners complain of the dismissal of some senior officers in the Slovakian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, determined only by their age. They refer to an ongoing practice of purging 
senior officials. In fact, the Slovak government had terminated the contracts of 13 employees 
of the Foreign Office aged over 50. The case falls within the scope of Directive 2000/78/EC, 
since Article 3 expressly quotes conditions of dismissal amongst the matters covered. Above 
in section 2.9 and below in Annex III an extensive analysis of the principles stated by the 
CJEU regarding the application of the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age is 
given. Even the Commission does not question the applicability of EU law but, since Directive 
2000/78/EC was transposed correctly by Slovakia, the Slovakian national authorities have 
the primary responsibility to ensure its correct application. Thus, the Commission suggested 
that the case be brought before the national courts (or before the national equality body). 
The opinion expressed by the Commission is not fully convincing. While it is true that when 
there is a breach of an individual right people should complain before a national court (or 
also before an equality body in cases of discrimination), the role of the Commission as 
‘guardian of the Treaties’ is different and aims to ensure that MSs fulfil their obligations under 
EU law. It is not clear in this case why the Commission has not found any need to investigate 
further, eventually opening a Pilot procedure, such as in the case Commission v. Hungary.144 
On the other hand the Commission has discretional power to decide on which cases it will 
start investigations. One possible reason not to open such a procedure in this case could be 
that the challenged national measure taken by the Slovakian government addressed ‘only’ 
13 people.  
 
Two other petitions - 0962/2014, bearing 28 signatories, and 1103/2014 - concern 
discrimination on the grounds of age but the challenged national law was later modified. 
Petitioners complained about the maximum age limit (30 years) for access to the Guardia 
Civil. Subsequently, and thanks to a judgment of the CJEU in a preliminary ruling, Spain has 
modified its legislation and increased the maximum age limit to 40 years. 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 
The analysis presented in this section draws on petitions which raise more problematic 
questions and where the opinion of the EU Commission is not thoroughly conclusive. A full 
list of the petitions received, classified by grounds of discrimination, is provided in Annex V. 
Where the cases are particularly complex and different legal issues arise, a detailed scrutiny 
is given.145  
 
Although they are all related to anti-discrimination law, the petitions received are quite 
different in terms of the respondent entity (the EU or Member States), the grounds of 
discrimination at stake (race or ethnicity, sexual orientation, nationality, age, disability, 
                                                 
144 Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary, 6 November 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687. 
145 We thank Prof. Adelina Adinolfi and Prof. Olivia Lopes Pegna of the University of Florence, for their constructive 
comments regarding the most controversial legal issues emerging from the petitions analysed. 
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language, national minority, and sex), and the legal sources invoked (the CFR or EU law in 
general).  
 
Some petitions concern only Member States and challenge a conduct of a public body or a 
civil servant or the application in an individual case of a piece of law. In other cases, petitions 
claim lack of action to combat discrimination at national level. When the responsibility of a 
Member State is at stake some petitions call upon the Parliament to promote initiatives at 
the national level or to monitor proper implementation of EU law. Petitions in which the 
responsibility of the EU institutions is challenged generally ask for the adoption of new acts, 
mostly however without specifying exact measures. 
 
Most of the petitions concern specific individual cases, while only a few petitions complain 
about discrimination against a ‘group’ or an issue of general interest. In many cases the poor 
description of the facts provided by the petitioners makes it difficult to understand exactly 
which legal issues are relevant to the case and to assess it properly.  
 
One of the most troublesome issues is that of EU competence. The material regarding the 
petitions received often contains a relevant statement: ‘explain to the petitioner that the 
Committee on Petitions does not have competence to intervene in individual cases’ (petition 
0320/2016). The European Commission in at least two of its opinions on this lot of petitions 
has stated the same (petitions 1847/2013, 2498/2013, 2543/2013 and 2546/2013). 
This appears to be a key issue emerging from the majority of petitions received and a major 
problem when trying to find an appropriate and satisfying reply to the petitioners. 
 
EU citizens should be aware that the right to petition is an instrument to communicate directly 
with the EU institution that represents their interests in general and not individually. This 
does not mean that EU citizens should not send petitions on their individual cases and allege 
the breach of one of their rights. On the contrary, individual cases may be useful to raise 
concerns that are more general and thus relevant from a political perspective. Against this 
background the PETI Committee should analyse the individual cases in order to assess the 
effectiveness of individual rights recognised by EU law, and to identify general issues the EP, 
in cooperation with the other EU institutions and, if possible, with the Member States, should 
explore more in depth. Petitioners should be informed that their claims will be dealt with with 
a view to finding general political solutions to issues of general interest highlighted in their 
petitions, rather than with a view to finding a legal solution to their specific case.  
 
The European Parliament does not have the powers to solve individual cases but it has the 
competence - and the duty - to act to find the most suitable solution to prevent similar cases 
from being raised again. For instance, several petitions on ‘alternative child custody’ 
concerned individual and very sensitive cases where minors are involved. When citizens 
submit such petitions they should be aware that the Parliament is not the institution charged 
with powers to solve their personal situations directly. They should however be informed  that 
the EP welcomes their petitions and that it will treat them as an alert on policies where the 
EU and the Member States should act differently and do better.  
 
It seems also worth mentioning that the petitions analysed in this study show that, when 
verifying whether an individual case entails discrimination, a complex and articulated 
assessment is required. Definitions, exceptions, evidences, scope of application and remedies 
have to be duly applied in the individual cases in order to establish the existence or not of a 
prohibited discrimination. To establish beyond doubt that a case falls within the scope of EU 
competences and that a discrimination has occurred, a thorough legal analysis is required. 
This in turn requires a detailed description of the facts and this is often lacking in the sample 
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of petitions analysed in this report. In all these cases the petitioners would need qualified 
legal advice and assistance in order to defend their rights at national level. The EU is already 
promoting instruments to properly inform EU citizens in this regard. The Petitions Portal of 
the PETI Committee could provide a direct link to these instruments, to enhance their visibility 
and popularity and to raise the EU citizens’ awareness that petitions are not the most 
appropriate instrument to solve legal cases with direct effects in the individual personal 
sphere. 
 
Lastly, two EU citizens submitted petitions claiming a discrimination suffered by their family 
members who are third country nationals. In these cases the petitioners seem to be unaware 
of the fact that the right to petition is not an exclusive right of EU citizens, but may be 
enjoyed also by third country nationals who are residing in one of the Member States. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The assessment of a case of discrimination needs a thorough analysis and specific legal 
expertise is necessary. The activities of collective actors, NGOs and institutional bodies should 
be encouraged to assist victims of discrimination. The European Parliament should support 
the activities of national equality bodies and enquire into the cooperation with other 
institutions and their effective roles. 
 
The issue of competence is a crucial one, as already mentioned here and in numerous other 
studies and case law. When a citizen reads in the Charter of Fundamental Rights that there 
is a principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of language and belonging to a national 
minority, it is understandable that petitions on these matters are submitted. The case of 
minorities is particularly interesting, since it is one where the value of the European Union 
and its fundamental rights exists, but the Union has little, if any, competence. In cases like 
these, the EP should: 
 
- take due account of the petitions received, start inquiries to better comprehend the 
causes at the origin of the petitions, and promote meetings, seminars and resolutions 
to stimulate national governments to find durable solutions. While referring to the 
non-EU binding legal instruments in force, notably those of the Council of Europe 
(such as the ECHR and the European Convention on National Minorities), the EP should 
reassure the petitioners that it will keep on monitoring the situation, taking into 
account other similar petitions; 
 
- develop guidelines for petitioners, e.g. a checklist, to ensure that, on the one hand 
EU citizens do not hold false expectations about the effects of their requests and, on 
the other hand they are made aware of the system of existing remedies. As is well-
known, EU law provides for a system of judicial protection with remedies available 
both at national and at European level. Moreover, there are information platforms 
funded by the EU to provide advice to EU citizens, when they exercise their right to 
freedom of movement and stay. During the petition submission stage the ‘submission 
portal’ should provide the necessary information about the system of existing 
remedies, and petitioners should receive information about any legal action already 
taken. In particular, potential synergies with instruments such as the Your Europe 
Portal (www.europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/index_en.htm), Clarity 
(www.fra.europa.eu/clarity/en) and Charterclick (http://52.58.51.113:3000/) might 
be explored. 
 
Both guidelines and checklist should aim at strengthening the petitioners’ knowledge about: 
 
- the rights invoked; 
- the competent entity (e.g. the EU or the Member States); 
- the relevant legal sources and their scope of application (e.g. the Charter/value 
only or in conjunction with an EU competence and secondary law); 
- the EP’s limited powers in individual cases; 
- the powers and competences of national equality bodies; 
- the EP’s powers on general issues even outside EU competences, but according 
to the EU’s fundamental rights and values (e.g. minorities, language, religion, 
homophobia, gender issues); 
- the system of judicial protection both at national and EU level; 
- the role of the EU Commission as Guardian of the Treaties.  
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Replies to petitions should be formulated in such a way as to ensure consistency with the 
CJEU's case law on the boundaries of the EU competence and the scope of application of EU 
law. Special attention should be paid to providing satisfying answers in cases falling outside 
that scope. 
 
When a petition concerns a matter within the Member States’ exclusive competence, but 
there is a reference to the rights invoked among the values of the EU and in the CFR, the EP 
should in any case take due account of the claims and make the petitioners aware of the 
paramount actions already taken and to be taken in the future (e.g. actions already taken by 
the EP regarding homophobia, minorities, religions). The responsibility of the MSs should be 
stressed, including in terms of their choice not to confer (enough) powers to the EU in certain 
fields, or not to allow the EU to legislate on an issue that falls within its competences. 
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ANNEX I – APPLYING THE NON-DISCRIMINATION 
PROHIBITIONS  
1. The judgment on discrimination 
The assessment of a claim of discrimination entails the application of an articulated judgment, 
first developed by the CJEU – directly applying the prohibitions entrenched in the Treaties – 
then laid down in anti-discrimination directives. Specific definitions, exceptions and a system 
of remedies apply. Different rules may apply for different grounds of discrimination, in 
particular regarding the scope of application and justifications. 
 
2. The definition of discrimination 
According to EU law the definition of discrimination entails three different concepts: direct 
discrimination, indirect discrimination and harassment. Direct discrimination means a 
difference of treatment based on a suspected ground or on the general principle of non-
discrimination. Indirect discrimination means a disadvantage produced by normative acts or 
practices which, although apparently neutral, in fact produce discrimination on one of the 
suspected grounds or on the general principle of non-discrimination.146 Protection against 
indirect discrimination is an aspect which strongly characterises the Union's legal order. 
Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is an example. As the national legal orders no 
longer contain direct discrimination147 which blatantly discriminates European citizens and is 
therefore more easily identifiable, the CJEU has predominantly considered cases of indirect 
discrimination, with a vast majority of cases dealing with national provisions based on 
residence.148 In two cases dealing with prohibition of wearing religious clothing, applied to 
workers of private companies, the Court has qualified the dismissal of two Muslim girls for 
wearing a headscarf as a case of indirect discrimination.149 The Court pointed out that the 
prohibition was applicable to any religious clothing and not only to clothes of a particular 
religion. It is worth noting that two Advocates General had endorsed different approaches, 
notably concerning the meaning of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ discrimination and the concept of 
‘genuine and determining occupational requirements’ provided by Directive 2000/78/EC at 
Article 4(1).  
According to the '2000 anti-discrimination directives the concept of discrimination includes 
also harassment, which means unwanted conduct related to any relevant grounds and having 
the purpose or the effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment. 
 
3. Comparison, disadvantage, objective justifications and explicit exceptions 
According to EU anti-discrimination directives and CJEU case law the concrete application of 
the prohibition to relevant cases involves a three-layer assessment of the facts: comparison 
between similar situations, existence of a disadvantage, and exclusion of an exception or of 
an objective justification. 
                                                 
146 Case C-419/92, Scholz, 23 February 1994, ECLI:EU:C:1994:62, para. 7; Case C-152/73, Sotgiu, 12 February 
1974, ECLI:EU:C:1974:13. 
147 Case C-55/00, Gottardo, 15 January 2002, ECLI:EU:C:2002:16. 
148 Case C-350/96, Clean Car, 7 May 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:205; Case C-57/96, H. Meints, 27 November 1997, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:564; Case Sotgiu, cit.; Case C-107/94, Asscher, 27 June 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:251; Case C-
279/93, Schumacker, 14 February 1995, ECLI:EU:C:1995:31; Case C-33/88, Allué e Coonan, 30 May 1989, 
ECLI:EU:C:1989:222; Case C-237/94, O’Flynn, 23 May 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:206; Case C-27/91, Le Manoir Sarl, 
21 November 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:441; Case C-367/11, Prete, 25 October 2012, ECLI:EU:C:2012:668; Case C-
20/12, Giersch, 20 June 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:411. 
149 Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui, cit.; Case C-157/15, G4S Secure Solutions, cit. See also above par. 2.8. 
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In application of the classical Aristotelian maxim according to which equality entails equals 
being treated equally and unequals unequally, the CJEU only considers cases where unequal 
treatment is applied to equal situations as being discriminatory. The difference in treatment 
of different situations which are not comparable does not constitute discrimination and is 
therefore legitimate. Technically, one can speak about discrimination only when the 
difference in treatment results from an act relating to comparable situations judged to be 
alike, or when the same treatment is applied to objectively different situations.150 Therefore, 
comparison is the first stage in the application of the prohibition of discrimination. 
Once the comparability of the cases has been established it is necessary to ascertain that 
there is a less favourable treatment of a person and that such treatment is the result of a 
rule or practice based on one of the relevant grounds, or is seemingly neutral but causing 
the same discriminatory outcome.151 The proof can be obtained simply from the interpretation 
of the rule, without having to prove that there has been an adverse effect on a greater 
number of persons, as it is sufficient that the legislation may have even potentially contained 
prejudice.152 
 
Finally, it is necessary to exclude the existence of an allowed exception or, concerning indirect 
discrimination, an objective justification, which makes the contested provision legitimate and 
compatible with EU law provisions. First of all, it should be clarified that an objective 
justification is different from an objective difference in the situations at stake and where a 
different treatment is allowed. To treat different situations in different ways is perfectly lawful 
and at times required by the application of the non-discrimination principle.153 Rules applying 
to objective justifications may differ depending on whether direct or indirect discrimination 
occurs. In the case of direct discrimination only those justifications which are expressly 
provided for in the Treaty or in secondary law are allowed. We should mention here the 
exception to the freedom of movement of workers specifically and categorically laid down by 
the Treaty for reasons of public policy, public security or public health (e.g. Art. 45.3 TFEU). 
These exceptions, which limit the principle of freedom of movement, envisage that a national 
of another Member State may be treated differently from the EU citizens of the host Member 
State.154 When an indirect discrimination occurs, apart from express derogations other 
objective justifications may be applied. Objective justifications are lawful when they are not 
grounded on nationality, when they pursue a legitimate aim and are proportionate, and when 
the same purpose cannot be pursued with a different measure.155 
 
EU anti-discrimination directives lay down specific rules for burden of proof, remedies and 
locus standi of collective actors. In relation to age or disability discrimination, moreover, 
special exemptions apply with regard to: genuine and determining occupational requirements 
(Article 4 of both '2000 directives and Art. 14(2) of Directive 2006/54/EC); employers with 
an ethos based on religion or belief (Art. 4(2) of Directive 2000/78/EC); and the armed forces 
(Article 3(4), Directive 2000/78). A positive duty to provide reasonable accommodation for 
people with disabilities stems from Art. 5 of Directive 2000/78/EC and from the UNCRPD. 
 
                                                 
150 Case Garcia Avello, cit. Barnard, Scott 2002. 
151 Case C-10/90, Masgio, 7 March 1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:107; Case O’Flynn, cit., para 18-21. 
152 Case O’Flynn, cit., para. 21. 
153 Case Sotgiu, cit. 
154 Cases Van Duyn, cit.; C-115/81 and C-116/81, Adoui and Cornuaille, 18 May 1982, ECLI:EU:C:1982:183; Cases 
C-65/95 and C-111/95, Shingara and Radiom, 17 June 1997, ECLI:EU:C:1997:300; Case C-260/89, ERT, 18 June 
1991, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254; Case C-350/96, Clean Car, 7 May 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:205; Case C-348/96, Calfa, 
19 January 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1999:6; Case Groener, cit. 
155 Case C-15/96, Schöning, 15 January 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:3; Case Allué and Coonan, cit.; Case Pastoors and 
Trans-Cap, cit. 
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ANNEX II – THE CHARTER AND MEMBER STATES 
 
According to Article 51(1) CFR, Member States are bound by the Charter ‘only when they are 
implementing Union law’. The CJEU interpreted156 this clause as meaning that national 
provisions can be challenged against the Charter only ‘when they fall within the scope of EU 
law’, which in turn means that an EU law binding legal rule, other than the Charter article 
allegedly violated, must be applicable to the situation at issue.  
 
Based on the CJEU’s case law the Charter is applicable (at least) to cases where the alleged 
violation of the fundamental right(s) granted therein concerns:  
 
1) national provisions which are functional to ensure the effective application of 
EU law at the national level; 
2) national provisions on matters covered by EU legislation, or directly affecting 
it; 
3) the application of EU law or the abovementioned provisions by the competent 
authorities; 
4) national provisions limiting the fundamental freedoms of movement foreseen 
in the Treaties; 
5) national measures which have the effect of depriving EU citizens of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their 
status as EU citizens. 
 
Before discussing briefly each situation it must be stressed that this taxonomy reflects the 
current state of evolution of the CJEU’s case law and, therefore, should not be regarded as 
an exhaustive one.  
 
Situation 1) encompasses different sets of national provisions/cases of which we single out 
the principal four. First, there is national legislation enacting the provisions involved 
specifically in order to give effect to an EU measure. For instance, national legislation 
transposing a directive. According to the CJEU this category includes also domestic provisions 
‘intended to ensure that the objective pursued by the Directive may be attained, including 
those which, after transposition in the strict sense, add to or amend domestic rules previously 
adopted’.157  
 
A second set of relevant cases are those where national provisions in practice give effect to 
EU law obligations, though they were not adopted specifically for that purpose. For instance, 
EU legislation often provides that the Member States shall determine effective, proportional 
and dissuasive sanctions applicable to infringements of national legislation implementing an 
EU directive. The Member States may enact ad hoc rules, but they may also refer to existing 
rules on sanctions already applicable to purely domestic infringements. Those provisions, 
when they are used in cases concerning the infringement of the relevant EU directive, fall 
within the scope of EU law. Therefore, the Charter is the primary reference source of 
                                                 
156 Notably, in Case C-617/10 Åckerberg Fransson, 26 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, paragraphs 19-22. 
157 Case C-144/04, Mangold, 22 November 2005, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709para. 51. In Case C-528/13, Léger, 29 April 
2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:288, for instance, the Court checked a national measure transposing Directive 2004/33/EC 
on technical requirements for blood donation against Article 21, in conjunction with Article 52(1). The national 
measure provided for a permanent deferral to blood donation for men who have had a sexual relations with other 
men. The Court observed that the domestic legislation at issue ‘expressly refer[red] to Directive 2004/33 in its 
preamble’. 
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fundamental rights protection based on which they can be challenged.158 By contrast, (only) 
domestic fundamental rights standards apply when the same rules on sanctions are used in 
cases which are not related to EU law infringements.  
 
Similarly, the third set of cases relates to the CJEU’s established case law according to which 
and in the absence of EU law rules governing the matter it is for the domestic legal system 
of each Member State ‘to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for 
safeguarding rights which individuals derive directly from [EU law]’.159 These procedural rules 
fall within the scope of the Charter, not only when they were enacted with the specific purpose 
to comply with the said EU law obligation, but also when they are relied on in EU law related 
cases, even though they were adopted independently from EU law.  
 
In a fourth set of cases the national provisions allegedly infringing the Charter provide the 
definition of specific notions and terms used within an EU measure which expressly refers to 
national law for that definition. Interestingly, those notions and terms may also concern 
matters outside the competences of the Union.160  
 
As regards the situation under 2), so far the CJEU relied on it only in cases falling within the 
scope of EU anti-discrimination measures, notably cases concerning age discrimination (a 
detailed overview on these is provided in Annex III). However, it seems applicable also when 
an allegedly discriminatory provision falls within the scope of a different piece of EU legislation 
(i.e. not related to discrimination). It deserves special attention because it is particularly far-
reaching in terms of national law coverage. Indeed, the rationale behind the CJEU’s reasoning 
in cases where this situation materialised is apparently that, once a matter is governed by 
EU law rules, national provisions dealing with it must comply with all EU fundamental rights 
and not only with those more connected to those EU law rules.  
 
If this is correct, the scope of application of Article 21 CFR is potentially very broad, given 
that discrimination issues may arise in any field covered by EU law rules. It must be stressed, 
however, that the allegedly discriminatory national provision shall concern precisely the same 
matter governed by EU law rules applicable to the case; the CJEU has indeed pointed out 
that ‘a certain degree of connection [must exist,] above and beyond the matters covered 
being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other’.161 
Moreover, depending on whether the trigger for the application of Article 21 CFR is an EU 
anti-discrimination directive or not, the legal framework against which the discriminatory 
nature of the national provision must be assessed is different. Where the connection is 
provided by an EU anti-discrimination directive, the contested provision will be assessed, 
essentially, against the directive, rather than against Article 21 CFR itself.162 An additional 
limit which applies when the connection is provided by an EU anti-discrimination directive, is 
that the national provision cannot be challenged against a prohibited ground which is 
mentioned by Article 21 CFR, but is not also tackled by the relevant directive.  
 
                                                 
158 See, for instance, Article 17 of Directive 2000/78 and Cases C-81/12, Asociaţia Accept, 25 April 2013, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:275, para. 62, and Case C-54/07, Feryn, 10 July 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:397, paragraphs 38 and 
40. 
159 Case 222/84, Johnston, 15 May 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:20, para. 16. 
160 Case C-401/11, Soukupová, 11 April 2013. See also Case C-400/10 PPU McB., 5 October 2010, 
ECLI:EU:C:2010:582. 
161 Case C-206/13 Siragusa, 6 March 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126. 
162 The Court clarified this point in Case C-416/13, Vital Pérez,13 November 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2371: ‘when it 
is ruling on a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of [both] the general principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of age, as enshrined in Article 21 CFR, and the provisions of Directive 2000/78, in 
proceedings involving an individual and a public administrative body, the Court examines the question solely in the 
light of that directive’. 
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Situation 2) implies that in cases falling within the scope of EU anti-discrimination legislation, 
the main added value of Article 21 CFR concerns disputes between private parties. Unlike EU 
directives, Article 21 may lead to disapplication of national conflicting provisions. By contrast, 
where the allegedly discriminatory provision falls within the scope of EU ‘non-anti-
discrimination’ legislation, Articles 21 and 52(1) CFR provide the relevant benchmark (see 
more on this in Annex III). 
 
In relation to situations 1) and 2), it is also worth stressing that the Charter is binding also 
on the social partners where they adopt – despite the collective agreements – measures 
which fall within the scope of EU law.163  
 
The situation under 3) encompasses all instances where the alleged violation of the Charter 
occurred in the context of the application of EU law (notably EU Regulations), or of national 
legislation giving effect to EU law (within the meaning of situations 1) and 2), by domestic 
authorities, either judicial or administrative.164 For instance, border guards apply EU law 
when they perform their duties under the Schengen Borders Code.165 Thus, they are bound 
by the Charter and in case of an infringement – such as a discriminatory treatment under 
Article 21 CFR – the victim should be granted, by the Member State concerned, effective 
judicial protection in line with Article 47 CFR.166 By contrast, the risk of a violation of the 
prohibition under Article 21 CFR does not seem, in and by itself, sufficient to require the 
competent domestic authority not to transfer to another Member State a person searched 
through a European Arrest Warrant (EAW) or an asylum seeker. At the present stage of 
evolution the case law of the Court refers to the situation where the transfer would expose 
the person to the risk of inhumane or degrading treatment.167 Instances of discrimination 
under Article 21 CFR may possibly be relevant as the cause of that risk.168 A more direct 
relevance could be imagined, however, at least in those cases where the EU legislator itself 
mentioned non-discrimination as an issue worthy of special attention. This happens, for 
example, in the EAW system.169  
 
The situation under 4) encompasses those instances where Member States' action interferes 
with the fundamental freedoms of movement (of EU citizens, workers and providers of 
services, goods, services, and capitals) guaranteed by the Treaties. According to CJEU’s 
established case law such action is compatible with EU law only insofar as it can be justified 
by the attainment of the objectives of general interest foreseen by the Treaties, EU law 
legislation or the case law of the Court. In addition, the Member State action concerned must 
pass a proportionality test in relation to the objective pursued, which also includes compliance 
with EU fundamental rights. In other words, a national measure interfering with a 
fundamental freedom cannot be held compatible with EU law when it pursues an objective of 
                                                 
163 Case C-297/10 Hennigs and Mai, 8 September 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:560, paras. 64-68. See also Case C-447/09 
Prigge and o., 13 September 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:573.  
164 Case C-329/13 Stefan, 8 May 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:815. 
165 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on 
the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ L 77, 23.3.2016, p. 1–
52. 
166 Case C-23/12 Zakaria, 17 January 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:24.  
167 See, on the asylum system, Joined Cases C-411/10 and 493/10 N.S. and others, of 21 December 2011, para. 
106; on the EAW, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi e Căldăraru, 5 April 2016, para. 94. 
168 See Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z, 5 September 2012, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:518. 
169 See recital 12 of Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant: 
“[nothing] in this Framework Decision may be interpreted as prohibiting refusal to surrender a person for whom a 
European arrest warrant has been issued when there are reasons to believe, on the basis of objective elements, 
that the said arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on the grounds of 
his or her sex, race, religion, ethnic origin, nationality, language, political opinions or sexual orientation, or that that 
person's position may be prejudiced for any of these reasons”. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 56 
general interest in such a way as to breach Article 21 CFR read in conjunction with Article 
52(1) CFR. The scope of this situation is also particularly far-reaching, notably because it can 
attract within the remit of the Charter (and more generally of EU law rules on non-
discrimination) national provisions adopted by the Member States in the exercise of their 
exclusive competences.170  
 
Finally, as regards situation 5) it must be recalled that according to established case law of 
the CJEU when the subject matter of a case is not governed by EU rules (other than the 
Charter) and the person alleging a violation of his/her fundamental rights has not exercised 
EU free movement rights, EU law is not applicable, nor is the Charter. These situations, which 
are commonly defined as ‘purely internal’, are governed entirely by national law. However, 
in Zambrano the CJEU introduced a limited exception to the ‘purely internal situation’ rule, 
arguing that EU law is relevant when national measures ‘have the effect of depriving EU 
citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their 
status as citizens of the Union’.171 The Zambrano case concerned a Colombian national who 
lived in Belgium with his wife (also a Colombian national) and their two children who were 
born in Belgium and had acquired Belgian nationality. After having resided and worked for 
several years in Belgium, Mr and Mrs Zambrano made a request to the Belgian authorities to 
regularise their situation. Their request was rejected and the two were ordered to leave 
Belgium. The case arrived before the CJEU which found that ‘[a] refusal to grant a right of 
residence to a third country national with dependent minor children in the Member State 
where those children are nationals and reside, and also a refusal to grant such a person a 
work permit, [would have the effect of depriving the genuine enjoyment by the children of 
their status as EU citizens].’172 
 
Subsequent case law of the CJEU shows that violations of fundamental rights cannot as such 
activate the Zambrano exception to the ‘purely internal situation’ rule. Rather, the measure 
concerned must have the effect – de jure or de facto – to compel an EU citizen to leave the 
territory of the Union.173 However, EU fundamental rights play a role in relation to the 
Zambrano-exception. As the CJEU clarified in Réndon Marin, national measures entailing the 
effect described in Zambrano are not necessarily incompatible with EU law; they indeed are 
if they pass a proportionality test which – as for derogations to the free movement provisions 
– includes compatibility with EU fundamental rights. Accordingly, in Réndon Marin, the CJEU 
affirmed that Article 20 TFEU ‘[precludes] national legislation which requires a third country 
national who is a parent of minor children who are Union citizens in his sole care to be 
automatically refused the grant of a residence permit on the sole ground that he has a 
criminal record, where that refusal has the consequence of requiring those children to leave 
the territory of the European Union’.174  
 
With the exception described under point 5) above, the situation of sedentary EU citizens is 
outside the scope of EU law and is entirely governed by national law. It serves no purpose to 
                                                 
170 Case C-186/87, Cowan, 2 February 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:472, para. 19. See also Case C-274/96, Bickel and 
Franz, 24 November 1998, ECLI:EU:C:1998:563. 
171 Case C-34/09 Zambrano, 8 March 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, para 42. 
172 Ibid., para. 43. 
173 Case C-256/11 Dereci, 15 November 2011, ECLI:EU:C:2011:734; Case C-434/09 McCarthy, 5 May 2011, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:277. 
174 Case C-165/14 Réndon Marin, 13 September 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:675, para. 87. The CJEU explained this 
exception to the “purely internal situation rule” observing that “[the] above situations have the common feature 
that, although they are governed by legislation which falls, a priori, within the competence of the Member States, 
namely legislation on the right of entry and residence of third country nationals outside the scope of provisions of 
secondary legislation which provide for the grant of such a right under certain conditions, they nonetheless have an 
intrinsic connection with the freedom of movement and residence of a Union citizen, which prevents the right of 
entry and residence being refused to those nationals in the Member State of residence of that citizen, in order not 
to interfere with that freedom” (para. 75). 
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denounce such situations as contrary to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of 
nationality, since this principle cannot be applied. This implies that when the national 
legislation of a Member State is less favourable than that of the EU, citizens of this Member 
State who have not exercised the freedom of movement will be subject to a less favourable 
treatment than the national of a Member State who instead has exercised this freedom. 
 
This situation is known as reverse discrimination: while citizens or companies from other 
Member States are guaranteed protection against disadvantages when circulating in a 
‘foreign’ territory, the same protection is not afforded to citizens or companies which have 
always been present in that territory. More specifically, this can occur in two situations: when 
EU law requires that the principle of mutual recognition applies in a certain sector, or when 
EU law confers advantages in order to favour the implementation of free movement. Reverse 
discrimination is therefore a typical implication of EU rules, notably EU rules on free 
movement, which with a view to facilitating circulation of EU citizens, sometimes confer more 
rights to EU citizens who are exercising the right to free movement than to the citizens of 
the host state. At the same time, this form of discrimination between citizens based on 
whether they have or have not exercised their right to freedom of movement highlights the 
evident contrast with the principle of equality in force in the individual Member States. This 
is even more evident when the hypothesis of the citizen who has returned to his/her state of 
origin is considered. In that case citizens of the same state are discriminated on the grounds 
of relevance or otherwise of their situation under EU law. 
 
Even though reverse discrimination is a side-product of EU law, the CJEU regards it as a 
matter of and for national law. Following this reasoning reverse discrimination is determined 
by the intersecting of national laws with EU law. The situations falling outside the scope of 
application of EU law fall entirely within the jurisdiction of the national laws and are qualified 
as purely national cases. However, the CJEU has clearly stated that EU law does not preclude 
Member States from removing discriminations stemming from a comparison between 
situations falling inside EU law and those falling outside by extending the EU rules even to 
cases falling within the national competence. Therefore, the removal of reverse discrimination 
is at the discretion of the Member States. 
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ANNEX III – CJEU CASE LAW ON AGE DISCRIMINATION 
1.  Judgment of 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04 Mangold, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709 
The CJEU affirms the existence of a general principle of EU law prohibiting discrimination on 
the grounds of age, which is also applied in disputes between private parties. The litigation 
from which the preliminary ruling in Mangold arose involves two private citizens, an employer 
and an employee, who disputed the compatibility of German legislation with Article 8 of 
Directive 1999/70/EC on fixed-term employment175 and with the prohibition of age 
discrimination as contained in Directive 2000/78/EC. Notably, the national legislation in 
question, by way of derogation from the general rule, allowed the conclusion of fixed-term 
contracts with workers aged 58 and older without any objective justification. The Court ruled 
that said legislation was not in conformity with Directive 2000/78/EC because it introduced 
a difference in treatment based solely on age, without taking into account other aspects 
linked to the structure of the job market or the personal situation of the workers affected.  
 
The peculiarity of the case was that at the time of the dispute the deadline for the 
implementation of Directive 2000/78/EC in Germany had not yet expired, because the state 
had taken advantage of the permitted three-year period that could elapse before 
implementing provisions dealing with age discrimination. The Court nonetheless relied on its 
case law according to which, pending the deadline for implementation, states shall refrain 
from enacting provisions that may compromise the effective achievement of the outcome 
sought by the directive. Yet, according to the well-established case law of the Court, 
directives cannot entail direct effect in disputes between private parties (direct horizontal 
effect). Whilst confirming this case law, in Mangold the Court based the duty of the referring 
judge to disapply the contested national legislation on the general principle prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of age, whose existence was affirmed for the first time in this case. 
Indeed, the Court affirmed that ‘Directive 2000/78 does not itself lay down the principle of 
equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation. Indeed, in accordance with Article 
1 thereof, the sole purpose of the directive is «to lay down a general framework for combating 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation», the 
source of the actual principle underlying the prohibition of those forms of discrimination being 
found, as is clear from the third and fourth recitals in the preamble to the directive, in various 
international instruments and in the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States’.176  
 
As a general principle of EU law the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age is relevant 
in all situations where EU law applies, which is a condition which was satisfied in Mangold, 
because the contested legislation was a measure implementing Directive 1999/70.177 
2.  Judgment of 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21 
 
The CJEU confirmed its Mangold ruling and upheld the continuity between the general 
principle of EU law prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age and the prohibition of age 
discrimination enshrined in Article 21(1) CFR. Case C-555/07 concerns Ms Kücükdeveci, who 
was dismissed by her private law employer with a notice that did not take into account the 
years she had been working before reaching the age of 25. Indeed, the relevant national 
legislation (Section 622(2) of the German Civil Code) provided that the notice period for 
                                                 
175 Notably, Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work 
concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 L 175, p. 43). 
176 Mangold, para. 74. 
177 Ibid., para. 75. 
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dismissal should be proportional to the length of the service, but working years completed 
before the employee reached the age of 25 should not be considered. The national court 
before which the woman challenged the dismissal and alleged its incompatibility with EU law, 
asked the CJEU to clarify its Mangold judgment. Confirming Mangold, the Court reiterated 
that Directive 2000/78/EC only gives specific expression to the prohibition of age 
discrimination, which under EU law has the status of a general principle deriving from 
international instruments and the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 
Unlike in Mangold, it also referred to Article 21(1).178  
 
The Court also reiterated that ‘[for] the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age to 
apply (...) [a] case must fall within the scope of European Union law’. This condition was 
satisfied because, unlike in Mangold, the allegedly discriminatory conduct occurred after the 
expiry of the implementation period of Directive 2000/78, and ‘[on] that date [i.e., the date 
where the period expired] that directive had the effect of bringing within the scope of [EU] 
law the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings, which concerned a matter 
governed by that directive, in this case the conditions of dismissal’.179 Thus, in Kücükdeveci 
there was no question of anticipatory effects of a directive, but only a question about the 
scope of application of a general principle of EU law. Whilst in Mangold the link between the 
national situation and EU law was given by the application of Council Directive 1999/70/EEC, 
only Directive 2000/78/EC could provide the link to EU law in Kücükdeveci. Indeed, the 
contested national provision concerned an issue - conditions of dismissal - covered by that 
directive, as provided by its Article 3(1).180 
 
When examining whether EU law precluded domestic legislation such as that at issue, the 
Court referred in reality to a ‘mixed-parameter’, relying on ‘the general principle of European 
Union law prohibiting all discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression in Directive 
2000/78’.181 Indeed, the test for justification of a difference of treatment on the grounds of 
age was modelled on Article 6(1) of the directive. After finding the contested legislation in 
contrast with EU law the Court confirmed its precedent Mangold also with respect to the issue 
of direct horizontal effects. Firstly, it reaffirmed the traditional position whereby such effects 
are precluded to the directive. Secondly, it considered that there was no space to solve the 
conflicts by interpreting the domestic legislation in conformity with EU law. Finally, it held 
that ‘the national court, hearing proceedings between individuals, [shall] ensure that the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, as given expression by Directive 2000/78, 
is complied with, disapplying if need be any contrary provision of national legislation, 
independently of whether it makes use of its entitlement (...) to ask the Court for a 
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of that principle’.182   
3.  Judgment of 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14 Dansk Industri (DI), ECLI:EU:C:2016:278 
 
With the judgment in this case the CJEU added an important precision to its Mangold-
Kücükdeveci case law, clarifying that neither the principles of legal certainty and the 
protection of legitimate expectations nor the possibility to claim liability of the state for the 
violation of EU law can alter the obligation of a national court, hearing a case between private 
parties, to disapply national legislation which is in contrast with the general principle 
                                                 
178 Ibid., para. 22. 
179 Ibid., paras. 24 and 25. On this particularly far-reaching criterion of connection between national law and the 
scope of application of EU law, see Annex X, notably the text under ii).   
180 According to this, Directive 2000/78/EC ‘shall apply to all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors, 
including public bodies, in relation to (...) (c) employment and working conditions, including dismissals and pay’. 
181 Ibid., para. 27. 
182 Ibid., para. 56. 
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prohibiting age discrimination, when the conflict cannot be solved through consistent 
interpretation of the domestic legislation with EU law. 
 
The preliminary ruling in Dansk Industri arose from a dispute between the heirs of Mr 
Rasmussen and his former private law employer, who, based on the applicable national 
legislation, had refused to grant a severance allowance on the grounds that the employee 
was entitled to claim an old-age pension from the employer under a pension scheme that Mr 
Rasmussen had joined before reaching the age of 50. At that time the CJEU had already 
declared the incompatibility of that legislation with Directive 2000/78/EC. The referring judge 
sought, in effect, guidance on the implications of the Court’s previous findings in a dispute 
involving private parties. The Court of Justice reiterated the same reasoning developed in 
Kücükdeveci: directives lack direct horizontal effect. However, Directive 2000/78/EC merely 
gives expression to the general principle of EU law prohibiting age discrimination, which is 
also enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter and applies in all situations falling within the scope 
of EU law. The situation of Mr Rasmussen concerns a matter – the conditions of dismissal – 
which is covered by Directive 2000/78/EC. 
 
The national court is under a duty to disapply the national legislation if it conflicts with the 
general principle prohibiting age discrimination, as expressed in Directive 2000/78/EC, if the 
conflict cannot be solved through consistent interpretation.183 The Court nonetheless held 
that ‘[n]either the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations 
nor the fact that it is possible for the private person who considers that he has been wronged 
by the application of a provision of national law that is at odds with EU law to bring 
proceedings to establish the liability of the Member State concerned for breach of EU law can 
alter that obligation’.184 
  
                                                 
183 Ibid., paras. 22-25 and 35. 
184 Ibid., para. 43. Interestingly, the Danish Supreme Court (the referring judge in Dansk Industri) ‘disobeyed’ to 
the Court of Justice: it indeed refused to disapply conflicting domestic legislation, arguing that the Danish Accession 
Act does not empower it to give precedence to an EU unwritten general principle over national law. The only remedy 
available to the employer was therefore a damage action against the State for breach of EU law. For a comment on 
the Danish Supreme Court’s “answer” to the CJEU, see S. Klinge, “Dialogue or disobedience between the European 
Court of Justice and the Danish Constitutional Court? The Danish Supreme Court challenges the Mangold-principle”, 
13 December 2016, available here http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.it/2016/12/dialogue-or-disobedience-
between.html. 
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ANNEX IV – INTERPLAY BETWEEN EU LAW SOURCES 
Ground of prohibited 
discrimination 
TFEU 
Article 21 
CFR 
Direct effect 
Power to 
enact EU 
legislation 
EU Legislation 
enacted and field 
Prohibition 
within the 
scope of EU 
law 
Nationality  
[art. 18 TFEU] 
Directive 
2004/38/EC [Free 
movement] 
 
Directive 
2014/54/EU 
[facilitating 
freedom of 
movement for 
workers] 
  
YES 
art. 18 
[Including 
horizontal: 
Angonese] 
 
No 
Directives 
Sex  
[art. 19 TFEU; 
 
art. 157 TFEU] 
Directives 
2004/113/EC 
[access to and 
supply of goods 
and services] 
2006/54/EC 
[employment and 
occupation] 
  
YES  
Art. 157 
[Including 
horizontal: 
Defrenne - 
equality 
between 
women and 
men] 
 
No art. 19 
Race  
[art. 19 TFEU] 
Directive 
2000/43/EC 
[employment and 
occupation, social 
protection and 
advantages, 
education, access 
to goods and 
supply of services] 
  
No art. 19 
 
No directive 
2000/43/EC 
 
No judgment 
so far on 21 
CFR 
Colour NO   ? 
Ethnic origin  
[art. 19 TFEU] 
Directive 
2000/43/EC 
[employment and 
occupation, social 
protection and 
advantages, 
education, access 
 No art. 19 
 
No directive 
2000/43/EC 
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to goods and 
supply of services] 
No judgment 
so far on 21 
CFR 
Social origin  
NO 
 
NO 
 No judgment 
so far on 21 
CFR 
Genetic features  
NO 
 
NO 
 No judgment 
so far on 21 
CFR 
Language  
NO 
 
NO 
 No judgment 
so far on 21 
CFR 
Religion or belief  
[art. 19 TFEU] 
Directive 
2000/78/EC 
[employment and 
occupation] 
 No  
art. 19 
 
No 
directive 
2000/78/EC 
 
No judgment 
so far on 21 
CFR 
Political or any other opinion NO NO  No  
art. 19 
 
No  
directive 
2000/78/EC 
 
No  
Judgment so 
far on 21 CFR 
Membership of a national 
minority 
NO NO  No  
judgment so 
far on 21 CFR 
Property NO NO  No  
judgment so 
far on 21 CFR 
Birth NO NO  No  
judgment so 
far on 21 CFR 
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Disability  
[art. 19 TFEU] 
Directive 
2000/78/EC 
[employment and 
occupation] 
 
UNCRPD 
 No  
art. 19 
 
No 
directive 
2000/78/EC 
 
No judgment 
so far on 21 
CFR 
Age  
[art. 19 TFEU] 
Directive 
2000/78/EC 
[employment and 
occupation] 
 No  
art. 19 
 
No 
directive 
2000/78/EC 
 
YES  
Art. 21 CFR 
[Including 
horizontal: 
Mangold, 
Kücükdeveci, 
AMS, Dansk 
Industri] 
 
Sexual orientation 
 
[art. 19 TFEU] 
Directive 
2000/78/EC 
[employment and 
occupation] 
  
No  
art. 19 
 
No 
directive 
2000/78/EC 
 
No  
judgment so 
far on 21 CFR 
Other grounds NO NO  
non-
exhaustive 
list of 
prohibited  
grounds 
 
No  
judgment so 
far on 21 CFR 
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ANNEX V – LIST OF PETITIONS RECEIVED 
National minorities and language (par. 3.2.) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references 
by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
 
0609/2013 
 
LT Poland 
Alleged discrimination 
against the Lithuanian-
speaking minority in 
Poland in education 
sector. 
Closing of schools 
teaching in the Lithuanian 
language in Poland's 
Puńsk district due to a 
lack of funding. 
no 
 
Outside the scope 
of EU law. 
0111/2016 
 
RO Romania 
Alleged discrimination 
against Hungarian-
speaking minority. 
Impossibility for the 
Hungarian minority in 
Romania to use 
Hungarian in 
administrative 
proceedings and no 
implementation of a 
domestic decree requiring 
three-language local place 
name signs. 
no 
(petition still 
open) 
 
 
0141/2016 SK Slovakia 
Alleged discrimination on 
grounds of language. 
National legislation 
prohibiting bilingual signs 
for railway stations that 
indicate place names of 
Hungary or Slovakia. 
no 
(petition still 
open) 
1123/2013 AT Austria 
Alleged discrimination on 
grounds of disability. 
Use of signs language by 
deaf persons. 
Although Austrian 
language of signs is 
constitutionally 
recognised as an official 
language, deaf Austrian 
citizens cannot use it as a 
first language and are 
obliged to learn spoken 
German in school. 
no 
Outside the scope 
of EU law. 
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0839/2014 DA LT 
Free movement of 
services (Audio-Visual 
Media Services Directive). 
Suspension of the 
retransmission of certain 
Russian-language TV 
channels in Lithuania, as 
a reaction to the EU-
Russia dispute over 
Ukraine. 
no 
Within the scope 
of Directive 
2010/13/EU 
(AVMS Directive), 
but no violation. 
0217/2014 LT LT 
The petitioner, acting on 
behalf of a group of 
deputies to the lower 
house of parliament of 
the Republic of Lithuania 
(Electoral Action of Poles 
in Lithuania), reports of 
multiple violations of the 
rights of ethnic minority 
in Lithuanian by the 
national administrative 
and judicial authorities. 
 
no 
Outside the scope 
of EU law. 
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Obstacles to the free movement of LGBT families (para. 3.3.1) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references 
by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
 
 
0807/2015 
 
IT Italy 
Lack of recognition of 
same-sex marriage. 
The petitioner is an 
homosexual civil 
servant who claims to 
have being obliged to 
hide his homosexual 
relation at work. 
no 
 
View not requested. 
0513/2016 
 
HE UK; HE 
Lack of recognition of 
parenthood in LGBT 
families. 
The petitioner is 
married to a British 
lady and gave birth to 
a child in Spain. Whilst 
in the Spanish birth 
certificate both women 
are registered as 
parents, only the 
biologic mother would 
be granted parental 
status both in Greece 
and the UK. 
no 
(petition still open) 
 
0320/2016 FR France 
Obstacles to free 
movement of family 
members of EU 
citizens. 
The petitioner and his 
non-EU same-sex 
partner, who are 
currently leaving 
outside the EU, would 
like to move in the EU. 
He claims having 
experienced 
discrimination on 
ground of sexual 
orientation during 
their dealings with the 
French consulates in 
Cape Town and in 
London. 
no 
View not requested. 
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0611/2015 IT Not specified 
Homophobia in 
general. 
The petitioner 
generically appeals 
against homophobia, 
indicating that it is 
attributable to a lack 
of education of adults 
and adolescents. 
no 
 
View not requested. 
 
0647/2015 IT 
(generic 
reference to 
Italian society) 
Homophobia in 
general. 
The petitioner 
generically reports on 
an homophobic 
atmosphere in Italy. 
no 
 
View not requested. 
 
1338/2015 
 
FR FR 
Homophobia in 
general. 
According to the 
petitioner, France has 
not taken sufficient 
measures to fight 
effectively against 
homophobia. 
no 
 
View not requested. 
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National citizenship law potentially entailing loss of EU citizenship (para. 3.3.2.) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
  
 
1315/2015 
 
HU Slovakia 
National legislation 
providing for the 
automatic loss of 
Slovak citizenship in 
case of taking of the 
nationality of another 
State. 
 
no 
 
Information 
requested from the 
Slovakian 
authorities. 
 
 
 
 
Free movement rights of non-EU family members of EU citizens (para. 3.3.3.) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
1164/2013 ET UK 
Obstacles to free 
movement of family 
members of EU 
citizens. 
Refusal of the UK to 
recognise the 
passports of the ethnic 
Russians (the Alien 
Passport). The mother 
of the petitioner is 
refused entry in the 
UK, where the 
daughter (an Estonian 
citizen married to a 
British citizen) lives. 
Alleged discrimination 
against the Russian  
minority in Estonia by 
the UK. 
no 
Not enough 
information to 
pursue the case any 
further. 
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Alternative care for children (par. 3.4.) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references 
by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
 
 
 
1852/2013 
 
1655/2013 
 
 
 
LA 
 
UK 
 
Alleged 
discrimination on 
grounds of ethnicity, 
religion and language 
by UK social 
services. 
Artt. 10, 22, 
24 and 33 
CFR 
 
Art. 3 Racial 
Equality 
Directive 
EU law not applicable. 
 
 
 
1847/2013 
 
 
NL 
 
UK 
 
Alleged 
discrimination on 
grounds of ethnicity 
and religion by UK 
social services. 
 
Art. 10 CFR 
 
Racial 
Equality 
Directive 
= 
 
 
2498/2013 
 
 
UK 
 
UK 
 
The petitioner 
disagrees with the 
decision to place her 
children in 
alternative care. No 
instances of 
discrimination are 
alleged and, based 
on information 
provided, it is 
difficult to identify 
any.  
no = 
 
 
2543/2013 
 
 
UK 
 
UK 
 
The petitioner 
complains of the 
conduct of the social 
services, but no 
instances of 
discrimination are 
alleged and, based 
on information 
provided, it is 
difficult to identify 
any. The petitioner 
complains also about 
a travel ban. 
no = 
 
 
 
2546/2013 
 
 
LT 
 
UK 
 
The petitioner 
complains of the 
conduct of the social 
services, alleging, 
inter alia, that her 
child is not allowed 
to speak his mother 
tongue (Lithuanian). 
no = 
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Age (par. 3.5.) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
 
 
0962/2014 
 
1103/2014 
 
 
ES 
 
Spain 
Age-limits for 
recruitment. 
The petitioners 
complain of the 
maximum age-
limit for access to 
the Guardia Civil 
(30 years). 
General 
reference to 
the EU Charter 
in petition 
0962/2014 
and to Art. 
21(1) TFEU 
in petition 
1103/2014) 
 
Recalls relevant 
case law of the 
CJEU and informs 
on the amendment 
of the contested 
legislation. 
 
0309/2015 SK SK 
Age-related 
dismissal of 
senior public 
officers. 
Dismissal of some 
senior officers in 
the Slovakian 
Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 
determined only 
by their age.  
Alleged ongoing 
practice of 
purging senior 
officials. 
no 
Responsibility of 
Slovakia to ensure 
correct application 
of Directive 
2000/78. 
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Access to social benefits and health care (not analysed specifically in the text) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
 
2314/2013 
 
2545/2013 
 
ES & DE Poland 
Alleged discrimination on 
grounds of nationality in 
relation to access to a 
student card for public 
transportation. 
Whilst in theory all EU 
students in the 
Netherlands have access 
to a special card providing 
free access to public 
transportation, or 
discounted fares, in 
practice the registration’s 
procedures cut out non-
Dutch nationals. 
Art. 3.2 TEU; 
Artt. 18-25 
TFEU; 
Titles IV and V 
TFEU 
 
Opened 
infringement 
proceedings against 
the Netherlands, 
but the CJEU held 
that no violation 
was at issue. 
 
1121/2015 
 
DE 
The 
Netherlands 
Alleged discrimination on 
grounds of nationality. 
The petitioner, a German 
citizen living in the 
Netherlands, complained 
that a Dutch organization 
wrongly took money from 
his pension for financing 
his health insurance. In 
his view, this would have 
was prevented him from 
accessing health care 
services in Germany. 
He was also requested to 
pay higher berthing fees 
than Dutch owners of 
boats, on the same spot. 
no 
No violation as 
regards the claim 
concerning access 
to health care. 
 
Insufficient 
information to deal 
with the claim 
concerning berthing 
fees. 
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1368/2013 PO MT 
Free movement of EU 
citizens – Issuing and 
renewal of residence 
documents. 
The petitioner is 
dissatisfied with the 
Maltese authorities’ new 
system for issuing and 
renewing e-Residence 
documents for citizens of 
EU Member States. He 
lives in Gozo and had to 
travel three times to the 
capital Valletta to return 
old documents,  obtain a 
provisional one and then 
get the final document. 
No 
Case falls within the 
scope of Directive 
2004/38/E but 
there is no 
violation.  
2294/2013 ES ES 
Alleged discriminatory 
refusal of the issue of a 
resident card for a TCN 
who is the familiar of an 
EU citizen. 
No 
Whilst Directive 
2004/38/EC is not 
applicable, 
information 
provided is not 
sufficient to 
establish whether 
case falls within the 
scope of Directive 
2003/109/EC. 
2642/2013 
 
FR ? 
The petitioner has faced 
difficulties in getting a 
signed S2 form for 
planned medical 
treatment, private 
medical insurance being 
too expensive for young 
expatriates. Thus he's 
seeking intra-European 
medical insurance 
arrangements for major 
illnesses and measures to 
enable all European 
citizens suffering from a 
severe or chronic illness 
to return to their country 
of origin for treatment, in 
order to avoid isolation 
from their families. 
 
No 
EU law does not 
make it obligatory 
on Member States 
to conclude intra-
European 
agreements on 
medical cover for 
serious illnesses but 
does nonetheless 
provide for 
coordination of 
Member States’ 
national systems in 
order to provide EU 
nationals – who are 
free to work outside 
their country of 
origin – with the 
assurance that they 
will not be 
discriminated 
against in regard to 
health insurance 
benefits. 
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Sex (not analysed specifically in the text) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
  
 
2406/2014 
 
 
IE 
 
 
 
EU and 
Member States  
 
Equal treatment 
between men and 
women. 
According to the 
petitioner, EU and 
national initiatives 
against violence 
would lead to ‘men 
discrimination’, 
insofar as they 
target violence 
against women 
only. 
no 
 
View not 
requested. 
 
0530/2015 IT IT 
Equal access to 
services. 
Petitioner 
complains of 
discrimination by 
means of the 
charging of 
different prices to 
men and women for 
admission to public 
premises, such as 
cinemas and discos. 
General 
reference to 
discrimination 
on ground of 
gender banned 
by EU law 
Responsibility of 
Italy to ensure 
correct application 
of Directive 
2004/113/EC. 
0381/2016 SW SW 
The petitioner urges 
the EU to include 
measures 
protecting breast 
feeders in the anti-
sex discrimination 
framework. 
no 
View not 
requested. 
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Race and ethnicity (not analysed specifically in the text) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
    
0678/2013 
 
 
UK 
 
 
UK (Public 
University) 
 
 
Equal treatment 
at work (public 
education) – 
Victimisation. 
 
Alleged unfair 
treatment by the 
employer, which 
is said to have 
taken action 
against the 
petitioner because 
s/he provided 
information 
concerning 
university 
recruitment 
procedures to an 
official from the 
Racial Equality 
Commission or 
represented a 
colleague in a 
labour relations 
hearing. 
 
Article 9 of 
Council 
Directive 
2000/43/EC 
 
EU law applicable, 
but no 
discrimination at 
issue. 
 
Disability (not analysed specifically in the text) 
Petition 
number 
Petitioner 
Nation. 
Responsible 
alleged 
discrim. 
Issue 
EU law 
references by 
petitioner 
Commission view 
 
1274/2013 
 
 
ES 
 
EU 
 
Air transport. 
Alleged 
discriminatory 
nature of some 
provisions of 
Regulation (EC) No 
1107/2006, insofar 
as they allow air 
carriers to deny the 
boarding of people 
with disabilities for 
security reasons; to 
require them to be 
accompanied, and 
to set a time frame 
for the request for 
assistance at the 
airport. 
Regulation No 
1107/2006 
(EC). 
 
Compatibility of the 
Regulation with EU 
primary law and no 
need to revise it in 
the short or 
medium term. 
 

